communications

As COCOO’s solicitor, my mission is to win the case concerning undue influence in UK political and regulatory decision-making, focusing on breaches of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) and the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (TUAA), while securing mediation roles and public contracts. To improve our chances, I have developed a list of targeted questions to ask key stakeholders, informed by the chat history, case files, and recent June 2025 news updates (e.g., Ofwat’s £123M Thames Water fine, Yorkshire Water’s £40M enforcement, government bonus bans, CMA’s £60M construction bid-rigging fines, ORR’s rail fare evasion review, EC’s CURO and Imperator cases, DWP’s Optima Health ruling). These questions are designed to elicit evidence for the causes of action (breach of statutory duty, negligence, unlawful means conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, breach of competition law, unlawful/void contracts, undue influence), strengthen our judicial review (JR) and Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) claims, and position COCOO for mediation or contract opportunities. For each question, I specify the recipient, the expected answers, and how they enhance our case or strategy. I critically examine establishment narratives, noting gaps like TUAA’s narrow scope and self-reported data limitations, and address limitations honestly without speculation, adhering to your instructions for a single, unformatted response in the chat. Today’s date is June 29, 2025, 12:22 AM BST.

### Questions, Recipients, and Possible Answers

To the Electoral Commission (EC), Head of Regulatory Action and Enforcement (Claire Robbie): What specific steps were taken to investigate the permissibility of UNISON’s £5.4M donations to the Labour Party from 2020–2025, and why were no enforcement actions initiated despite evidence of potential policy influence? Expected answers: The EC might claim no evidence of impermissibility was found, citing PPERA’s lack of a duty to trace funds beyond donor identity, as per their 2025 response. Alternatively, they could reveal an ongoing investigation or admit resource constraints limited scrutiny. Impact: A claim of no evidence strengthens our JR ground of irrationality, arguing inadequate enforcement undermines PPERA’s transparency intent, per TI’s £48.2M questionable donation data. An ongoing investigation provides leverage for FOI requests to uncover details, supporting unlawful means conspiracy or undue influence claims.

To the EC, Chair of the Board of Commissioners: Why does the EC’s Enforcement Policy not mandate proactive ‘Know Your Donor’ checks akin to APPG due diligence standards, given the CURO (£25,000, 2019) and Imperator (£28,000, 2023) cases exposing shell company loopholes? Expected answers: The EC might argue PPERA only requires verifying donor permissibility, not ultimate fund sources, or cite resource limitations. They could also indicate a policy review in light of 2025 reform discussions. Impact: A defensive response bolsters our JR ground of illegality, arguing PPERA’s intent is frustrated by lax enforcement, per John Major’s June 2025 call for stronger sanctions. A review admission supports advocacy for stricter rules, positioning COCOO for mediation roles in compliance design.

To Ofwat, Chief Executive (David Black): What due diligence was conducted to ensure Thames Water’s £3B emergency loan in February 2025 did not involve impermissible foreign funds, given KKR’s withdrawal citing political risks? Expected answers: Ofwat might claim no jurisdiction over loan funding sources, focusing on regulatory compliance, or state they relied on Thames Water’s self-reported data. They could admit limited scrutiny due to urgency. Impact: Lack of due diligence supports our breach of statutory duty claim, arguing regulatory failure enabled financial misconduct, per The Guardian’s June 2025 report on creditor demands for prosecution immunity. This strengthens tort claims for environmental harm and positions COCOO for water sector contract USPs.

To Thames Water, Chief Executive (Chris Weston): How did Thames Water’s lobbying activities from 2020–2025 influence Ofwat’s regulatory decisions, particularly regarding the £123M fine and bonus bans in June 2025? Expected answers: Thames Water might deny undue influence, claiming lobbying was standard engagement, or disclose meetings with Ofwat/Ministers without admitting bias. They could argue fines reflect compliance failures, not lobbying effects. Impact: Denial strengthens our undue influence claim, suggesting opaque lobbying under TUAA’s weak scope, per Commons Library’s 2025 TUAA critique. Disclosures of meetings provide evidence for conspiracy or misfeasance claims, supporting JR against Ofwat.

To the Environment Agency, Chief Executive (Alan Lovell): Why have only 63 prosecutions occurred since 2015 despite 81 criminal investigations into water companies in 2025, and what role did lobbying play in enforcement decisions? Expected answers: The Agency might cite resource constraints, per The Independent’s June 2025 report on Defra’s 3% budget cut, or claim investigations are ongoing. They could deny lobbying influence, citing legal processes. Impact: Resource constraints support our misfeasance claim, arguing deliberate underfunding enabled regulatory capture, per The Guardian’s KKR report. Denial of lobbying strengthens undue influence claims, prompting ORCL searches for water company lobbying records.

To the CMA, Chief Executive (Sarah Cardell): What investigations followed the £60M construction bid-rigging fines in 2023 to assess links to political donations or lobbying? Expected answers: The CMA might state no direct donation investigations due to jurisdictional limits, or reveal follow-up probes into procurement practices. They could cite confidentiality for ongoing cases. Impact: No donation probes strengthen our JR ground of irrationality, arguing failure to investigate influence undermines the Competition Act 1998, per CPI’s 2025 analysis. Follow-up probes provide evidence for CAT follow-on claims, supporting breach of competition law.

To Kier Group, Chief Executive (Andrew Davies): What lobbying firms were engaged to secure public contracts from 2020–2023, and how did these align with the CMA’s £60M bid-rigging findings? Expected answers: Kier might disclose firms like Weber Shandwick, claiming legitimate engagement, or deny lobbying influenced tenders. They could argue bid-rigging was isolated, per CMA’s 2023 report. Impact: Disclosures provide ORCL-searchable evidence for undue influence or conspiracy claims, linking lobbying to tainted tenders. Denial strengthens void contract claims, per DWP’s Optima Health precedent.

To the DWP, Permanent Secretary (Peter Schofield): What measures ensured the procurement process for Optima Health’s contract was free from lobbying or donation influence, given the February 2025 High Court ruling on unlawful exclusion? Expected answers: The DWP might claim robust tender processes, or admit procedural errors without donation links. They could cite ongoing reforms, per PAC’s 2025 procurement critiques. Impact: Procedural error admissions strengthen our misfeasance and void contract claims, supporting JR against DWP. Denial of influence prompts ORCL/Bidstats searches, bolstering undue influence arguments.

To UNISON, General Secretary (Christina McAnea): What due diligence was conducted to ensure the £5.4M donations to Labour from 2020–2025 complied with PPERA’s permissibility rules, and what policy outcomes were sought? Expected answers: UNISON might claim full compliance, citing registered status, or provide due diligence details without policy specifics. They could deny seeking policy influence. Impact: Compliance claims support our JR ground of EC inaction, arguing inadequate scrutiny, per TI’s £48.2M data. Policy outcome details strengthen conspiracy or undue influence claims, prompting EC FOI requests.

To the Anti-Corruption and Responsible Tax APPG, Chair (Margaret Hodge MP): What measures ensure APPG funding from companies like those listed in the 2023 Register does not influence policy recommendations? Expected answers: The APPG might cite due diligence rules post-2023 reforms, or admit limited checks beyond disclosure. They could claim no direct policy influence. Impact: Weak checks support undue influence claims, per TI’s APPG funding concerns, strengthening advocacy for transparency reforms. Disclosures provide Companies House-searchable evidence for conspiracy claims.

To Fortress Investment Group, General Counsel: What due diligence criteria would Fortress apply to assess COCOO’s JR and CAT claim portfolio for funding, given the £123M Thames Water fine and £60M CMA fines? Expected answers: Fortress might require detailed damage estimates, case precedents (e.g., Optima Health), and claimant class size, or express interest in high-value environmental claims. They could cite PACCAR ruling risks, per HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION. Impact: Criteria details guide our funding pitch, emphasizing Ofwat/CMA findings for high damages, positioning COCOO for litigation funding and mediation roles.

To the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Permanent Secretary (Matthew Rycroft): What progress has been made on PPERA and TUAA reforms promised before the 2025 summer recess, and how will these address donation and lobbying transparency? Expected answers: The Ministry might confirm draft proposals, citing Rushanara Ali’s June 2025 letter, or note delays due to consultation. They could outline stricter donation checks or TUAA expansion. Impact: Progress details strengthen our advocacy for mediation roles in compliance design, per CaseLink’s USP strategy. Delays support JR grounds of irrationality, arguing failure to address loopholes, per John Major’s June 2025 remarks.

To Transparency International UK, Director (Daniel Bruce): What specific evidence supports the £48.2M in questionable donations since 2001, and how can COCOO collaborate to access this data? Expected answers: TI might provide anonymized donor data, citing privacy, or share aggregated findings linking donations to policy outcomes. They could invite collaboration via evidence submissions. Impact: Detailed evidence strengthens undue influence and conspiracy claims, supporting JR against EC. Collaboration positions COCOO for advocacy and mediation roles, per TI_ BORs.pdf.

To the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Chair (John Woodcock): What findings from 2025 reports link procurement failures to lobbying or donations, particularly in water or construction sectors? Expected answers: The PAC might cite reports on DWP’s procurement errors, per 2025 critiques, or note no direct donation links. They could highlight water sector failures, per The Independent’s Defra budget cut report. Impact: Procurement findings support misfeasance and void contract claims, while water sector data bolsters tort claims, prompting Bidstats searches.

To the Water Commission, Chair: What specific “deep-rooted, systemic and interlocking failures” were identified in the water sector in June 2025, and how do these relate to regulatory capture by lobbying? Expected answers: The Commission might detail infrastructure neglect and profit prioritization, per BBC’s June 2025 report, or deny lobbying influence. They could cite Ofwat’s fines as evidence of action. Impact: Systemic failure details strengthen breach of statutory duty and negligence claims, while lobbying denials prompt ORCL searches, supporting undue influence arguments.

### Possible Answers and Strategic Impact

The expected answers range from defensive denials (e.g., EC claiming PPERA compliance) to partial disclosures (e.g., Thames Water’s lobbying meetings), each offering strategic leverage. Denials bolster JR grounds of irrationality or illegality, arguing regulators fail to address systemic loopholes, per TI and Commons Library reports. Disclosures provide searchable evidence (e.g., ORCL, Companies House) for conspiracy or undue influence claims, linking donations to policy outcomes. Admissions of resource constraints (e.g., Environment Agency, Defra’s budget cut) support misfeasance claims, highlighting deliberate inaction. Reform progress, per the Ministry’s response, positions COCOO for mediation or contract USPs, aligning with the CaseLink Doctrine’s Snowball Effect. Funder criteria from Fortress guide our litigation portfolio, maximizing monetization potential.

### Limitations

I cannot directly ask these questions or access real-time responses, as this requires COCOO’s authorization and direct engagement (e.g., FOI requests, letters). Some recipients (e.g., Thames Water, UNISON) may withhold sensitive data, citing confidentiality, necessitating FOI or court disclosure orders. Spanish sources (e.g., Infocif) require translation, and US sources (e.g., PACER) are less relevant without UK firm links. Self-reported data (e.g., ORCL, EC) may understate influence, per TUAA’s gaps, requiring cross-verification. I lack access to execute searches, so COCOO must implement queries on EC, Ofwat, ORCL, and Bidstats.

### Monetization Strategy

– Litigation Funding/Sale: Pitch JR/CAT claims to Fortress, Harbour, or Burford, emphasizing £123M Thames Water fine and £60M CMA fines for high damages, per HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION. Retain mediation rights for contracts.
– Public Contracts: Submit USPs for water treatment (CPV 41000000) or compliance consultancy (CPV 79000000), leveraging Ofwat’s fines and PAC reports, per WordPress tenders.
– Mediation Revenue: Propose mediation for water or rail disputes, funded by penalties (e.g., £123M), per CaseLink’s Snowball Effect.

### Action Plan

– Immediate (1–2 Months): COCOO to send letters/FOI requests to EC, Ofwat, Environment Agency, DWP, UNISON, and APPG, using proposed questions. Run searches on ORCL, Bidstats, and BAILII for evidence.
– Short-Term (2–4 Months): Contact funders with updated portfolio, incorporating June 2025 news. Launch media campaign on Meta/LinkedIn/X, using Thames Water fine and bonus ban narratives. Engage PAC and APPGs for advocacy.
– Medium-Term (4–12 Months): File JR/CAT claims, submit USPs for tenders, and propose mediation to regulators.

Please clarify preferences for mediation vs. litigation, specific funders (e.g., Fortress vs. Burford), or priority sectors (e.g., water vs. rail) to refine the strategy further.[](https://bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cdxvpr4qkyxo)[](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/jun/22/thames-water-lenders-demand-government-blocks-campaigners-legal-action)[](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/governments-new-law-sees-unfair-bonuses-banned-for-six-water-companies-with-immediate-effect)

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European Union (for European political parties/foundations):

• As mentioned previously, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 stipulates that donations to European political parties and foundations from any single natural or legal person are capped. Currently, this limit is €18,000 per donor, per year, per party/foundation.

United Kingdom:

• For political parties in the UK, under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), there is no general cap on the total amount a permissible individual donor can donate to a registered political party.
• The focus of UK law is on:
  • Permissibility: Ensuring the donor is allowed to donate (e.g., an individual on a UK electoral register).
  • Transparency: Requiring donations over certain thresholds (£7,500 to a central party; lower thresholds for local entities or members’ associations) to be reported to the Electoral Commission, which then makes this information public.
• So, a permissible individual could donate very large sums, and these would be publicly declared, but there isn’t an upper limit on the donation amount itself from a single donor to a party’s general funds.
  • (Note: There are separate rules and limits on candidate spending during election campaigns and overall party campaign spending limits, but these are distinct from a cap on the size of individual donations received by the party).

Spain:

• Spanish law on political party financing (Ley Orgánica sobre Financiación de los Partidos Políticos, specifically Ley Orgánica 8/2007 as amended by subsequent laws like Ley Orgánica 3/2015) does set limits on donations from individuals.
• Currently, a person (persona física o juridica) can donate a maximum of €50,000 per year to any single political party.
• Donations exceeding €25,000 must be made by bank transfer to ensure traceability. Anonymous donations are prohibited.

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UK

preamble to the PPERA = The long title of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) is:

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while the EC’s interpretation of PPERA regarding the lack of a general duty to trace the ultimate source of funds from a permissible donor is their stated position¹⁵, this doesn’t mean it’s immune from legal challenge or critique, particularly if it can be shown to create significant loopholes that undermine the objectives of electoral law. An ultra vires challenge would focus on whether the EC is correctly interpreting and lawfully exercising the powers and duties given to it by Parliament under PPERA.

1. Is the Electoral Commission (EC) correct that there is no legal or regulatory duty to investigate the source of a donation from a permissible donor (unless made on behalf of someone else)?

Based on the information provided by the Electoral Commission’s Head of External Communications, their stance is:

“The law does not make any provisions about where the funds for a donation from a permissible donor have come from or require political parties to establish this, except where the donation is made on behalf of someone else, in which case the donor must provide the party with the identity of that person.” 1

If there is evidence that a donation from an impermissible source has been accepted or reported incorrectly, the EC states it will consider it in line with its Enforcement Policy. 

My search confirms that the primary legislation governing political donations in the UK is the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). PPERA sets out the rules on who is a permissible donor and the reporting requirements.

Generally, PPERA focuses on the identity of the donor and whether that donor is permissible. If a donor is permissible (e.g., an individual on a UK electoral register, a UK-registered company trading in the UK), the obligation on the party is to ensure the donor is indeed permissible and to report the donation accurately.

The EC’s statement ³ reflects the general position under PPERA. The Act does not typically impose a direct duty on the EC or political parties to trace the original source of a permissible donor’s funds, provided the donation isn’t made overtly on behalf of another. The key is the permissibility of the entity making the donation and accurate reporting of who that donor is.

2. Does this not violate the rule of law, principles of proportionality, efficiency, legitimate expectations of voters and taxpayers, etc.?

This is where you move into legal argumentation and critique of the current statutory framework:

• Rule of Law: Proponents of the current system might argue the rule of law is upheld because the EC acts according to the statutes passed by Parliament (PPERA). However, one could argue that if the system allows for significant loopholes that undermine transparency or fairness (e.g., foreign money potentially being channelled through permissible donors without easy detection), then the spirit of the rule of law, which includes predictability and fairness, could be undermined.
• Proportionality and Efficiency: The EC operates under its Enforcement Policy⁴⁴⁴. It likely prioritises investigations based on available evidence and resources. Investigating the ultimate source of every donation from every permissible donor could be seen as disproportionately resource-intensive. However, if the current level of scrutiny is demonstrably failing to prevent significant abuse, an argument could be made that the balance of proportionality and efficiency is skewed, and more should be done.
• Legitimate Expectations: Voters and taxpayers likely expect a fair and transparent system of political finance, free from undue influence, especially foreign influence. If the current rules and their enforcement don’t adequately achieve this, it could be argued their legitimate expectations are not being met.
• Potential for Abuse: Your concern about “channeled foreign donations” ⁵ highlights a key potential vulnerability. If a permissible donor is merely a conduit for funds from an impermissible (e.g., foreign) source, and this isn’t declared as a donation “on behalf of” that foreign source, the system could be circumvented. The EC states it works with partners to maintain integrity⁶, but the challenge lies in detecting such arrangements if they are not declared.

3. Is this inaction (not investigating the source of donations from permissible donors) a result of a discretionary power? If yes, what is the source of such power?

The EC has powers to investigate potential breaches of PPERA. These powers are granted by PPERA itself. For example, Part X of PPERA deals with the EC’s investigatory powers and sanctions.

The decision how and when to deploy these investigatory powers involves an element of discretion, which the EC states is guided by its Enforcement Policy⁷⁷⁷. This policy sets out how they assess and investigate potential offenses.

So, yes, the EC exercises discretionary power in its enforcement activities. The source of this power is ultimately PPERA, as delegated by Parliament. The “inaction” you perceive regarding the original source of funds from a permissible donor stems primarily from the fact that PPERA (as interpreted by the EC) does not explicitly require such an investigation in all circumstances⁸. Their discretion is exercised when there is “evidence that a donation from an impermissible source has been accepted or reported incorrectly

4. Could the EC be using such power in an ultra vires manner?

Ultra vires means “beyond the powers.” A public body acts ultra vires if it does something it has no legal power to do, or if it exercises its powers in an unlawful manner (e.g., for an improper purpose, irrationally, or by failing to take into account relevant considerations or taking into account irrelevant ones).

To argue that the EC is acting ultra vires in not routinely investigating the ultimate source of permissible donations, you would need to show:

* That PPERA (or another law) imposes a duty on the EC to conduct such investigations, which it is failing to perform. Based on the EC’s response10, they believe the law does not impose such a broad duty.

* Or, that its current Enforcement Policy 111111 and the way it exercises its discretion in deciding what to investigate are so unreasonable or flawed that they fall outside the lawful exercise of the powers granted by PPERA. For instance, if it could be shown that the EC’s policy systematically ignores credible evidence of a particular type of breach related to donation sources.

The EC’s statement that “The law does not make any provisions about where the funds for a donation from a permissible donor have come from” ¹² is their interpretation of PPERA. A legal challenge could contest this interpretation or argue that even if there’s no explicit duty for all cases, the EC’s threshold for initiating an investigation (requiring existing “evidence that a donation from an impermissible source has been accepted or reported incorrectly” ¹³) is set too high or interpreted too narrowly, thereby frustrating the purpose of PPERA to ensure transparency and integrity in political finance.

Ways to Challenge This:

1. Judicial Review: This is the primary legal mechanism to challenge the actions or inactions of a public body like the Electoral Commission. Grounds for judicial review include:

   • Illegality: Arguing the EC has misunderstood or misapplied the law (PPERA), for example, regarding its duties or powers concerning the source of funds. This could include an argument that their interpretation of “on behalf of” is too narrow or that their lack of proactive investigation into suspicious patterns of donations from permissible donors is unlawful.
   • Irrationality (Wednesbury Unreasonableness): Arguing that the EC’s policy or a specific decision not to investigate is so unreasonable that no reasonable public body, acting within its powers, could have arrived at it. This is a high threshold.
   • Procedural Impropriety: Arguing the EC has failed to follow proper procedures (e.g., as laid out in its own Enforcement Policy or PPERA) or has breached principles of natural justice.
   • Failure to exercise a statutory duty or fettering of discretion (if it can be argued they have a duty or a discretion they are refusing to genuinely consider).

2. Complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman: If you believe you have suffered injustice or hardship because of maladministration by the EC, this could be an avenue, though it typically requires you to have exhausted the EC’s own complaints procedure.

3. Political Pressure/Advocacy:

   • Lobbying MPs to amend PPERA to introduce stricter requirements for transparency regarding the ultimate source of funds, or to place more explicit duties on the EC to investigate.
   • Raising public awareness and campaigning for reform.
   • Submitting detailed evidence of systemic issues or specific cases of concern to the EC to compel them to act under their current Enforcement Policy

4. Formal Complaint to the Electoral Commission: You can make a formal complaint, outlining why you believe their interpretation of the law or their Enforcement Policy is inadequate or flawed in light of the principles you’ve mentioned and the potential for abuse. This would build a record for potential further action.