INVESTIGATION

INVESTEGATE

FOREIGN DIMENSIONS

For our cause of action concerning the breach of statutory duty, our primary focus should be on the water industry, where recent regulatory actions have been particularly robust. The water regulator, Ofwat, has significantly increased its enforcement activity. On its public enforcement case register, a landmark decision from late May 2025 stands out: a record penalty of nearly £123 million was imposed on Thames Water. This was not for a single incident, but for a combination of serious, systemic failures in its wastewater operations and for breaching rules on dividend payments while its environmental performance was so poor. Ofwat’s investigation found that the majority of Thames Water’s treatment works with specific permits could not meet the required conditions due to operational issues. This finding is a definitive indictment of the company’s failure to meet its core statutory duties. Furthermore, the register shows an enforcement case opened against Yorkshire Water in March 2025 regarding its sewage treatment works, which resulted in a £40 million enforcement package. We can also draw on the government’s announcement from early June 2025, which explicitly banned bonuses for executives at six water companies—including Anglian Water, Southern Water, and Thames Water—due to their unacceptable environmental performance and, in some cases, serious pollution incidents logged in late 2024. These specific, dated findings from the regulator provide irrefutable evidence that these private companies have failed in their public service obligations, giving us a direct launchpad for claims on behalf of those affected by the resulting environmental damage. The Environment Agency complements this with its own successful criminal prosecutions, and while its online data is less of a simple register, reports from early 2025 confirm that since 2015, it has secured over £150 million in fines from water companies through 63 prosecutions for pollution offences, with the majority of serious incidents in the most recent reporting period being attributed to Anglian, Southern, Thames, and Yorkshire Water.

In relation to our cause of action for unlawful public contracts, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) provides the most potent findings. The CMA’s register of infringement decisions under the Competition Act 1998 is our key resource. A significant finding from 2023 involved fining ten UK construction firms a total of nearly £60 million for engaging in cartel activity, including illegal bid-rigging on public sector demolition contracts. This is a classic example of an FOI that we can use to ‘follow on’. We can argue that any public body that awarded a contract to one ofthese named firms based on a tainted bid has entered into a void or voidable contract. The new Procurement Act 2023, which came into force in early 2025, strengthens our hand considerably. It makes certain competition law infringements, such as a formal CMA decision on cartel activity, a mandatory ground for excluding a supplier from future public contracts. This legislative change, coupled with the CMA’s specific findings, allows us to argue not only that past contracts were illegal, but also that any ongoing contractual relationship with these infringing companies is now untenable for any public authority. We can therefore bring actions on behalf of legitimate businesses who lost out on these tenders, using the CMA’s infringement decision as the bedrock of our claim, which saves us from the costly and complex process of proving the anti-competitive behaviour ourselves.

For our claims against public bodies for maladministration, we can point to very recent and relevant High Court judgments. In a ruling from February 2025, the Court of Appeal found in favour of Optima Health against the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The DWP had excluded Optima’s tender for a contract, which would have been the winning bid, due to minor and obvious clerical pricing errors. The court ruled that the DWP acted unlawfully by not seeking clarification and that its decision to disqualify the bid was unjustified. This is a granular finding of a public body’s procedural failure and flawed decision-making in a live procurement process. It directly supports our arguments that public bodies often fail to act rationally and fairly, causing direct economic harm to private entities. This is not a historical case; it provides a current, specific example of a court finding a government department’s procurement conduct to be unlawful, which we can use to great effect.

Finally, for tortious claims such as negligence where a formal infringement decision is less common, we can rely on detailed independent reviews from regulators that establish a pattern of failure. The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) provides a powerful example. In response to a major controversy in late 2024 where tens of thousands of fare evasion convictions were quashed due to procedural errors by train operators, the ORR conducted an independent review of their revenue protection practices, with the report published in June 2025. While not a finding of infringement in a legal sense, the report is a damning indictment of systemic failures. It details how train operating companies have taken disproportionate and unfair action against passengers for genuine mistakes, such as accidentally selecting the wrong railcard type even when the discount was identical, or having a water-damaged printed ticket despite having proof of purchase. The ORR’s report provides authoritative evidence of the industry’s failure to treat passengers fairly, which is a key component in establishing a breach of the duty of care owed by these private companies to their customers. We can use these specific findings and case studies within the report to build a robust argument for negligence on behalf of passengers who have been unfairly penalised.

For our cause of action related to breach of statutory duty, particularly involving the private sector’s delivery of public services, the regulatory activity in the water industry is highly relevant. The Water Services Regulation Authority, Ofwat, maintains a public register of enforcement cases.¹ This register details numerous findings of infringement against private water companies. For example, there are documented enforcement actions and the imposition of significant financial penalties against companies like Thames Water and Southern Water for failures in their sewage treatment works and for causing environmental damage through pollution incidents.² These formal findings by Ofwat, and the parallel criminal prosecutions successfully brought by the Environment Agency for illegal sewage discharges, serve as conclusive proof of the companies’ breaches of their legal obligations. We can use these established infringements to follow on with claims for the damages caused by this pollution, without needing to re-prove the initial wrongdoing.

In relation to the unlawful awarding of public contracts, the Competition and Markets Authority’s register of decisions under the Competition Act 1998 is a critical resource. This register contains definitive findings of infringement against companies that have engaged in anti-competitive behavior, such as bid-rigging and illegal cartels, in the context of public procurement. For instance, the CMA has issued infringement decisions against construction firms found to have colluded on bids for public sector projects.³ These decisions, which often result in substantial fines, establish that the named companies have broken competition law.⁴ Such a finding is a powerful tool for our case, as it provides the foundation to argue that any public contract awarded through such illegal conduct is void. We can use these decisions to launch follow-on damages claims in the Competition Appeal Tribunal on behalf of businesses that were unlawfully excluded from the bidding process.

Regarding our claims against public bodies for maladministration or failures in their oversight functions, we can point to specific court judgments. A notable example is the High Court’s ruling that the government acted unlawfully by failing to publish details of COVID-related PPE contracts in a timely manner, breaching its own transparency policies and procurement regulations.⁵ This judicial finding of unlawfulness against a government department provides a strong precedent. While not a finding against a private company, it establishes a public body’s failure in its duty, which can be linked to the subsequent harms or losses suffered by others. It supports our arguments that there is a systemic issue of public bodies failing in their core responsibilities, which in turn enables or fails to prevent misconduct by private sector partners.

Finally, for tortious claims such as negligence, while a direct ‘Finding of Infringement’ from a regulator is less common, the reports and reviews published by bodies like the Office of Rail and Road can be used as strong evidence. For instance, the ORR’s independent review of train operators’ revenue protection practices identified systemic issues and a lack of fairness in how passengers are treated.⁶ While not a formal infringement decision leading to a fine, these official findings highlight widespread failings and a disregard for consumer rights. We can leverage these reports in a negligence claim to demonstrate that the train operating companies were aware of the problems and the harm they were causing to passengers, yet failed to take appropriate action, thereby breaching their duty of care.

COAS

Based on our extensive history and the documents we have analyzed, several potential causes of action in both tort and contract law have been identified that involve both public and private sector entities.

In tort law, a primary cause of action against public sector bodies is for a breach of statutory duty. This arises when a government department or a regulator, such as the Environment Agency or a transport authority, fails to perform its legally mandated obligations to protect the public interest, leading to foreseeable harm. For example, a regulator’s persistent failure to take enforcement action against private companies for environmental pollution or for systemic failures in public services could constitute such a breach. In these scenarios, the private companies that are the direct cause of the harm, such as a polluting water company or a failing rail operator, can be held jointly responsible as concurrent tortfeasors. The public body is liable for its negligent inaction, and the private company is liable for its harmful actions, with both contributing to the same damage. Another potential tort is misfeasance in public office, which would involve proving that a public official knowingly acted unlawfully to benefit a private entity, causing harm to others.

In contract law, the causes of action often center on the validity and legality of the agreements between public and private entities. A key strategy is to challenge a public contract as being void or unlawful from its inception. This could be on the grounds that the public body acted beyond its legal powers, or ultra vires, when awarding the contract, or that the procurement process itself was fundamentally flawed, lacking the required transparency and fairness. A contract awarded through a non-competitive or biased process could be challenged in court, and if successful, declared void. In such a case, both the public body that awarded the contract and the private company that was its beneficiary would be jointly implicated and responsible for the consequences of the unlawful agreement. This approach seeks to invalidate the very foundation of the relationship between the public and private entities, thereby addressing the root cause of the resulting harm

For our legal case, I focused on identifying specific clauses and documented communications that establish a clear timeline of events and demonstrate a pattern of behavior. The contractual agreements were particularly useful, as I extracted the precise language regarding obligations, deliverables, and breach of contract provisions. This information is crucial for building a logical and fact-based argument, highlighting the failures to meet agreed-upon terms. I also pulled email correspondence that contained explicit acknowledgements and promises, which serve as powerful evidence of intent and subsequent inaction. The reason for extracting these specific details is to create an undeniable factual foundation for our legal arguments, making our position less assailable.

In support of our campaign, I identified compelling personal testimonies and data points that evoke an emotional response and underscore the urgency of our cause. I extracted narratives that detail the real-world impact of the issues at hand, focusing on the human element and the tangible consequences. From the reports you sent, I pulled statistics that quantify the scale of the problem, such as percentages of affected populations and financial disparities. This combination of personal stories and hard data was extracted because it allows us to craft a campaign message that is both emotionally resonant and intellectually credible, appealing to a broader audience and motivating them to action.

For our mediation projects, I concentrated on finding areas of potential common ground and previously overlooked concessions within the communications. I looked past the immediate points of conflict to extract phrases and statements that suggested a willingness to negotiate or a shared understanding of certain underlying issues, even if expressed in a heated context. The goal here was to identify starting points for dialogue. By isolating these less adversarial elements, we can frame the mediation sessions constructively, steering the conversation toward mutual understanding and resolution rather than dwelling on past grievances. This approach helps to de-escalate tension and build a foundation for a successful mediated agreement.

The Problem: Lobbying, Donations, and the Risk of Corruption

The foundational argument is that while lobbying is a legitimate part of the democratic process, it carries significant risks of distorting policy and leading to corruption. A report from Transparency International (TI) highlights that Britain has the world’s third-largest lobbying industry, worth an estimated £2 billion, yet the regulatory regime is inadequate. Loopholes in the rules can open the door to corrupt activity. The report identifies a series of permissible activities that run the risk of abuse, including the ability of major party donors to be offered peerages and the lack of requirements for lobbyists to declare expenditure on gifts and hospitality for public officials. This creates a “doom loop” where parties become dependent on a small group of wealthy backers, exposing them to undue influence and powerful special interests with little accountability. TI’s research found that almost one in every ten pounds reported by political parties since 2001 comes from unknown or questionable sources, with £48.2 million linked to donors alleged to have bought privileged access or political honours. This overreliance on big money erodes public trust, with a majority of people believing the government is run by a few big entities acting in their own best interests.

The Scale: Corporate Lobbying Expenditure

The scale of corporate lobbying at the EU level, which includes many multinational firms highly active in the UK, provides context for the financial power wielded by special interests. Lobbying data reveals that corporations and their trade associations are spending vast sums to influence policy, with the top 162 entities spending at least €343 million annually. The highest-spending sectors include Big Tech (Microsoft), Energy (Shell), and Chemicals/Agribusiness (Bayer), all of which are subject to significant UK regulation. These enormous expenditures are seen as paying off, securing a “Competitiveness Compass”—a sweeping deregulation agenda—and highlighting the risk of “regulatory capture” where public decision-making is skewed to serve corporate interests. The LobbyFacts database itself empowers journalists and researchers to track this influence over time. In 2022, top spenders included Shell, Bayer, and Meta (Facebook), while the 2015 data shows major spending from companies like Philip Morris International, ExxonMobil, and Microsoft.

The UK Mechanism: All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs)

A specific UK-based mechanism for corporate influence is the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). APPGs are informal cross-party groups of parliamentarians that pursue a particular topic or interest. While they provide a valuable opportunity to engage with outside organisations, their funding and administration create significant risks.

APPGs can receive external funding and benefits in kind, such as secretariat support, which must be declared if they exceed £1,500 from a single source in a calendar year. However, corporations have been the largest source of monetary donations to APPGs, raising concerns over inappropriate lobbying and corruption. Reports have found that private healthcare and weapons companies were key funders of relevant APPGs. This creates a risk of “cash for access,” where commercial lobbying occurs under the guise of legitimate policy discussion.

Recognising these risks, new rules were introduced in 2023 to ban foreign governments from funding secretariats and to increase transparency. However, concerns remain that foreign influence could still be channelled indirectly and that the rules do not go far enough, for example by restricting funding to only “permissible donors” as defined in UK electoral law. Crucially, while APPGs may use the term “parliamentary,” they are not official parliamentary bodies, yet their association with Parliament lends them a “cloak of legitimacy” that can be exploited by commercial lobbyists. The direction and policy of an APPG must remain the sole responsibility of its parliamentary members, but the reliance on external funding creates a clear risk of undue influence.

Legal Grounds for Challenge: Undue Influence and Unlawful Agreements

The relationships fostered by political donations and lobbying can give rise to legal challenges against the decisions or contracts that result.

Undue Influence: The legal doctrine of undue influence applies where a person uses their power to unfairly influence another’s decisions, depriving them of free will. It can be presumed where a relationship of “trust and confidence” exists alongside a “transaction that calls for explanation”. One could argue that a pattern of significant political donations, coupled with privileged access through APPGs and lobbying meetings, creates a relationship of dependency and trust between a corporation and a public official or government department. If this relationship leads to a policy decision, procurement contract, or regulatory forbearance that is highly favourable to the donor and detrimental to the public interest, it could be considered a “transaction that calls for explanation,” raising a presumption of undue influence that could render the resulting decision or contract voidable.

Unlawful Agreements: Competition law provides a framework for identifying and sanctioning agreements that harm the market. The core prohibitions target horizontal agreements (between competitors) and vertical agreements (between firms at different levels of the supply chain) which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition.

Horizontal Unlawful Agreements: These are the most serious infringements and include practices like price-fixing, market sharing, bid-rigging, and exchanging competitively sensitive information. A case could be made that lobbying efforts by a group of dominant firms within a sector, potentially coordinated through a trade association, which result in a regulatory outcome that limits market entry or fixes parameters of competition (such as technical standards), has the same effect as an illegal horizontal agreement. The coordinated lobbying itself could be construed as a “concerted practice” designed to distort competition.
Vertical Unlawful Agreements: These agreements in the supply chain can also be anti-competitive, particularly through practices like resale price maintenance (fixing the price at which a distributor can resell a product) or imposing exclusive territories. Lobbying by a powerful manufacturer to secure regulations that, for instance, impose technical standards that only its distributors can meet, could create vertical restraints that foreclose rivals from the market. Such a regulatory outcome, achieved through political influence, would mimic the effect of a prohibited vertical agreement.

By framing the outcomes of successful lobbying and political donations in these legal terms, a case can be built that such activities do not merely create an uneven political playing field, but can lead to legally questionable agreements and decisions that are vulnerable to challenge.

Based on the legal principles and market contexts detailed in our chat, there is a clear possibility that certain tortious actions and contractual arrangements identified could be deemed unlawful or invalid under UK law. The provided documents outline both the types of conduct that lead to liability and the legal doctrines that can nullify agreements, which can be applied to the various market situations we have examined.

The most direct examples of unlawful agreements are the cartels identified in the regulatory case files. Contracts between undertakings to engage in bid-rigging, as seen in the construction demolition sector, or to exchange competitively sensitive information, as in the gilts trading investigation, would be considered void. This is because they are made for an illegal purpose, contravening both statutory prohibitions like the Competition Act 1998 and the common law doctrine that renders contracts to commit a tort or a crime unenforceable. Any such collusive agreement, whether formal or informal, would fall into this category. The harm caused by this conduct gives rise to tort claims, specifically for breach of statutory duty, which is the basis for the follow-on damages actions brought by victims of these cartels.

Furthermore, contracts could be challenged on the grounds that they are contrary to public policy. This is particularly relevant to our case concerning political donations. If a contract with a public body, for instance, in the nuclear services, satellite procurement, or private healthcare sectors, was secured through the corruption or bribery of public officials, it would be deemed illegal and void. The legal primers are clear that contracts which tend to corrupt public officials or interfere with their impartial judgment are unenforceable. This doctrine would apply to any agreement, whether with a domestic public body or a foreign state-owned enterprise, where political donations were used as a quid pro quo to improperly influence the award of the contract.

Beyond outright illegality, some contracts could be rendered voidable due to the way in which agreement was obtained. In markets characterised by a significant imbalance of power, such as between a dominant technology platform and small developers, or between a major retailer and its suppliers, the doctrine of economic duress could be invoked. If a dominant firm threatens to delist a smaller company or withhold access to an essential service unless it agrees to new, detrimental terms, the resulting contract could be set aside. The case files on app store practices and platform data use suggest scenarios where such pressures could exist. Similarly, the doctrine of undue influence could apply where a relationship of trust and confidence is abused, a risk that may arise in joint ventures or in dealings with powerful state-owned entities in sectors like oil and gas.

Another significant ground for unlawfulness, as you mentioned, is ultra vires conduct by a public authority. If a regulator or any public body acts beyond the scope of the powers granted to it by statute, its actions are unlawful. While this is primarily a public law concept challenged through judicial review, it has clear implications for contract and tort law. A contract entered into by a public body acting ultra vires would be void. Moreover, if it could be proven that an official knowingly acted beyond their powers with the intention of causing injury to a party, this would constitute the tort of misfeasance in public office, giving rise to a claim for damages. This connects the lawfulness of a public body’s actions directly to potential tortious liability.

Finally, many of the ongoing collective action cases mentioned, such as those concerning interchange fees or the conduct of large digital platforms, are themselves founded on the allegation of collective torts. The core of these claims is that the companies have committed the tort of breaching their statutory duties under competition law, causing widespread harm to consumers or businesses. The success of these actions depends on proving that the conduct was indeed unlawful and caused the harm alleged, thereby establishing tortious liability on a massive scale.

CASELEX – GEMINI REPORT

An analysis of the provided case files through the lens of political donations and influence reveals how market definitions and competitive dynamics are deeply intertwined with regulatory and political landscapes. In industries where government regulation, public contracts, intellectual property law, and standard-setting are paramount, companies have a significant incentive to engage in political activities to protect and enhance their market positions. The competition authorities’ decisions, while based on economic principles, invariably operate within and reflect these politically shaped environments.

Energy and Infrastructure: The Politics of Access and Control

The energy sector, encompassing oil and gas exploration, transport infrastructure, and nuclear services, operates at the nexus of global commerce and national strategic interest. The market definitions in these cases reflect a landscape where government control, regulation, and access to critical infrastructure are paramount, making political engagement a crucial business function.

In the cases concerning oil and gas, a key distinction is made between the different stages of the value chain. The market for the exploration of crude oil and natural gas is considered global, as exploration companies operate worldwide. ¹¹¹¹ However, as the product moves downstream, the market definitions narrow significantly. The market for the development, production, and wholesale supply of natural gas is seen as regional or national, constrained by the physical location of pipelines and import terminals. ² For instance, the European Commission, in its analysis of the acquisition of the In Salah gas field in Algeria, focused its assessment on the supply of gas into Italy, recognizing the physical and contractual pathways that define the market.

This is even more pronounced in the market for gas import infrastructure, which is defined nationally. ⁴⁴⁴⁴ In one case, the Commission considered that specific pipelines, like the Transmediterranean pipeline connecting Algeria to Italy, could even be viewed as a natural monopoly for the import of Algerian gas, constituting a market in itself. ⁵ Similarly, the market for the transport of refined oil products via the Druzhba pipeline was considered as a potential distinct market, narrower than the global market for crude oil, because refineries connected to it have limited alternatives.

This focus on critical infrastructure highlights the immense political stakes. Control over pipelines and LNG terminals is a matter of national energy security. Companies like Eni and state-owned enterprises like Sonatrach operate in a sphere where business decisions and foreign policy are inseparable. ⁷⁷⁷⁷ Securing rights to build and operate such infrastructure, or gaining access to it, involves navigating a highly political process. Political donations and lobbying are essential tools for companies seeking to influence government decisions on infrastructure projects, transit rights, and the regulatory frameworks that govern access and pricing.

The nuclear services industry represents another area of intense government oversight. The market for services and equipment for a nuclear power plant’s core systems is considered at least EEA-wide or even global. ⁸⁸⁸⁸ However, entry into this market is not merely a commercial decision. It requires navigating stringent safety regulations, security protocols, and national certification processes. As noted in the case concerning Westinghouse, local presence was an element to be taken into account by customers. ⁹ Given that the primary customers are operators of national nuclear power plants, often state-owned or heavily regulated, companies providing these highly sensitive services must maintain strong relationships with national governments and regulatory bodies. Political engagement is crucial for building the trust and securing the approvals necessary to operate in such a critical and politically sensitive sector. A similar dynamic applies to the wind turbine industry, where the market is global ¹⁰ but success is heavily dependent on national renewable energy policies, subsidies, and planning permissions, making government relations critical.

Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology: The National Gateway for Global R&D

The pharmaceutical industry cases consistently illustrate a two-tiered market structure that necessitates a parallel two-tiered political strategy. The market for pipeline products—drugs still in the research and development phase—is considered at least EEA-wide, if not global. ¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹ This reflects the worldwide nature of scientific research and clinical trials, as seen in the development of treatments for conditions like HIV, sickle cell disease, and products targeting the complement system.

Once a product is ready for commercialization, however, the market shrinks dramatically. The market for the supply of marketed finished dose pharmaceuticals (FDPs) is consistently defined as national in scope. ¹³¹³¹³¹³ This is a direct consequence of national regulatory frameworks, including drug pricing mechanisms, marketing authorizations, and, most importantly, public reimbursement systems. ¹⁴¹⁴¹⁴¹⁴ As the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority noted in the AstraZeneca/Alexion case, while R&D is global, suppliers primarily compete on price at the national level, where single buyers like the UK’s NHS hold significant power.

This bifurcation creates a clear map for political engagement. Pharmaceutical companies lobby at an international and EU level on issues like intellectual property rights, patent term extensions, and the framework for clinical trials. At the same time, they must engage in intense national-level lobbying and political donation to influence the pricing and reimbursement decisions that determine a drug’s commercial success in each country. The distinction between markets for different drug classes, such as the various treatments for HIV (NRTIs, PIs, etc.), further illustrates the targeted nature of these efforts. ¹⁶ Vertically related markets, such as the at-least EEA-wide market for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) and contract manufacturing, are also shaped by this dynamic, as their viability depends on the success of the final products in national markets.

Technology, Media, and Regulated Services: The Politics of Standards and Access

The technology, media, and other regulated service sectors are defined by innovation, network effects, intellectual property, and often, direct government licensing or public procurement.

The case concerning SIM cards illustrates how product standards shape markets. The market for SIM cards is considered distinct from other smart cards and is at least EEA-wide in scope. ¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸ However, the related markets for payment smart cards and ID smart cards are viewed as potentially national, partly due to country-specific standards (like the CB scheme in France) and the need for local presence for secure data personalization. ¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹ Companies in this sector have a strong incentive to participate in and influence standard-setting bodies and to lobby governments on security and data-handling regulations.

In the digital economy, the markets for web analytics and business intelligence (BI) tools are global. ²⁰ This case involved Google, a company whose business model is deeply intertwined with data. ²¹ The ability to collect and analyze vast amounts of data is a source of immense market power. Such companies are at the forefront of policy debates around data privacy, digital competition, and online advertising. Political donations and sophisticated lobbying operations are central to their efforts to shape these regulations globally. The market for server virtualization software and hardware components like NICs and FC HBAs is also global, driven by standardized technology. ²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²² Here, political engagement can be aimed at influencing public procurement standards for government and military contracts, as well as trade policies affecting global supply chains.

The market for commercial satellites is global, with private operators holding worldwide tenders. ²³²³²³²³ This is a high-stakes, high-tech industry with significant dual-use (commercial and military) potential. ²⁴ As such, it is subject to national security considerations and export controls. Companies in this sector engage with governments to secure licenses, influence space policy, and compete for lucrative government and military contracts, where political relationships can be as important as technical specifications.

The music industry case demonstrates how market definition adapts to technology. A national market for the wholesale of physical music exists alongside an at-least EEA-wide market for digital music. ²⁵²⁵²⁵²⁵²⁵²⁵²⁵²⁵²⁵ Market power is concentrated among major record labels, whose influence stems from their control over vast copyrighted catalogues and their A&R function. ²⁶ These companies lobby extensively on copyright law, anti-piracy enforcement, and the legal framework for digital streaming—all areas where political decisions directly impact their revenues.

Finally, the private healthcare and financial trading sectors are heavily regulated. In Spain, the private healthcare market is local, reflecting patient preference for proximity and the structure of public-private healthcare agreements. ²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷ Private operators compete for public contracts, creating a direct incentive for political engagement to influence the terms of these tenders. ²⁸ In financial services, the market for shares and derivatives trading is at least EEA-wide, a direct result of EU-level financial regulations. ²⁹²⁹²⁹²⁹ Financial firms are among the most significant political donors, seeking to shape the complex rules that govern their industry.

Industrial and Raw Materials: The Politics of Environment and Trade

The cases covering timber, paper, and pulp and rubber and plastics highlight industries where the political focus is often on environmental regulation and trade. The market for pulp is global ³¹³¹³¹³¹, while markets for wood panels and paper are at least EEA-wide, with transport costs playing a role. ³²³²³²³² The market for butyl rubber is also at least EEA-wide, if not global. ³³³³³³³³ For these industries, political donations and lobbying are often directed at shaping environmental standards, emissions regulations, and trade policies, including tariffs and anti-dumping rules, which can significantly impact their international competitiveness.

Energy and Infrastructure: The Politics of Access and Control

In the cases concerning oil and gas, a key distinction is made between the different stages of the value chain. The market for the exploration of crude oil and natural gas is considered global, as exploration companies operate worldwide¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹. However, as the product moves downstream, the market definitions narrow significantly. The market for the development, production, and wholesale supply of natural gas is seen as regional or national, constrained by the physical location of pipelines and import terminals²²²². For instance, the European Commission, in its analysis of the acquisition of the In Salah gas field in Algeria, focused its assessment on the supply of gas into Italy, recognizing the physical and contractual pathways that define the market³.

This is even more pronounced in the market for gas import infrastructure, which is defined nationally⁴⁴⁴⁴. In one case, the Commission considered that specific pipelines, like the Transmediterranean pipeline connecting Algeria to Italy, could even be viewed as a natural monopoly for the import of Algerian gas, constituting a market in itself⁵⁵⁵⁵. Similarly, the market for the transport of refined oil products via the Druzhba pipeline was considered as a potential distinct market, narrower than the global market for crude oil, because refineries connected to it have limited alternatives

This focus on critical infrastructure highlights the immense political stakes. Control over pipelines and LNG terminals is a matter of national energy security. Companies like Eni and state-owned enterprises like Sonatrach operate in a sphere where business decisions and foreign policy are inseparable⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷. Securing rights to build and operate such infrastructure, or gaining access to it, involves navigating a highly political process. Political donations and lobbying are essential tools for companies seeking to influence government decisions on infrastructure projects, transit rights, and the regulatory frameworks that govern access and pricing.

The nuclear services industry represents another area of intense government oversight. The market for services and equipment for a nuclear power plant’s core systems is considered at least EEA-wide or even global⁸⁸⁸⁸. However, entry into this market is not merely a commercial decision. It requires navigating stringent safety regulations, security protocols, and national certification processes. As noted in the case concerning Westinghouse, local presence is an important factor for customers⁹. Given that the primary customers are operators of national nuclear power plants, often state-owned or heavily regulated, companies providing these highly sensitive services must maintain strong relationships with national governments and regulatory bodies. Political engagement is crucial for building the trust and securing the approvals necessary to operate in such a critical and politically sensitive sector.

Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology: The National Gateway for Global R&D

The pharmaceutical industry cases consistently illustrate a two-tiered market structure that necessitates a parallel two-tiered political strategy. The market for pipeline products—drugs still in the research and development phase—is considered at least EEA-wide, if not global¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰. This reflects the worldwide nature of scientific research and clinical trials, as seen in the development of treatments for conditions like sickle cell disease and products targeting the complement system

Once a product is ready for commercialization, however, the market shrinks dramatically. The market for the supply of marketed finished dose pharmaceuticals (FDPs) is consistently defined as national in scope¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹². This is a direct result of national regulatory frameworks, including drug pricing mechanisms, marketing authorizations, and, most importantly, public reimbursement systems¹³¹³¹³¹³¹³¹³¹³¹³¹³. As the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority noted in the AstraZeneca/Alexion case, while R&D is global, suppliers primarily compete on price at the national level, where single buyers like the UK’s NHS hold significant power

This bifurcation creates a clear map for political engagement. Pharmaceutical companies lobby at an international and EU level on issues like intellectual property rights, patent term extensions, and the framework for clinical trials. At the same time, they must engage in intense national-level lobbying and political donation to influence the pricing and reimbursement decisions that determine a drug’s commercial success in each country. The distinction between markets for different drug classes, such as the various treatments for HIV (NRTIs, PIs, etc.), further illustrates the targeted nature of these efforts¹⁵. Vertically related markets, such as the at-least EEA-wide market for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) and contract manufacturing, are also shaped by this dynamic, as their viability depends on the success of the final products in national markets

Music and Digital Content: The Politics of Copyright

The music industry case demonstrates how market definition adapts to technological change, and how political influence is key in an industry built on intellectual property. The European Commission identified a national market for the wholesale of physical music, reflecting the logistical realities of distributing CDs and other media¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷. In contrast, the market for the wholesale of digital recorded music is considered at least EEA-wide, and possibly broader, reflecting the borderless nature of digital distribution

In this industry, market power is concentrated among a few major record companies. Their strength is derived not just from their distribution networks but from their Artists and Repertoire (A&R) activities—the discovery and development of artists—which acts as a significant factor in their market position¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹. This gives them immense influence over the music ecosystem. The case explicitly notes that legal and illegal music do not belong in the same market, as legal retailers do not consider illegal suppliers to be viable substitutes²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰. This distinction is itself a product of political and legal action. Major music companies are powerful lobbyists, engaging with governments to strengthen copyright laws, extend the duration of copyright protection, and push for more aggressive enforcement against piracy. Political donations can be instrumental in ensuring that the legislative and regulatory framework continues to support their business model, particularly in the face of disruption from new digital technologies and platforms

Technology, Gaming, and Intellectual Property: The Politics of Standards and Ecosystems

The technology and media sectors, from mobile operating systems and electronic displays to video games and IT services, are defined by innovation, network effects, and the strategic importance of intellectual property. The cases in these areas highlight markets where technical standards and platform control are key, creating fertile ground for political lobbying.

In the case concerning mobile operating systems, the European Commission identified a market distinct from that of PC operating systems, noting the mobile OS is a central part of any smart mobile device¹¹¹¹. The analysis acknowledges the power of a platform like Google’s Android, where OEMs are free to use the open-source code but risk losing access to crucial Google applications if they alter the OS in a way that breaks compatibility². This dynamic creates a powerful ecosystem. Companies controlling such ecosystems have a vested interest in influencing policies related to digital competition, data privacy, and intellectual property. Similarly, the case on client PC operating systems and web browsers directly addresses the issue of a dominant player, Microsoft, using its market power in one market (PC operating systems) to influence another (web browsers)³. Such cases often attract intense political scrutiny and lobbying, as competitors seek regulatory intervention and the dominant firm seeks to defend its practices. Political donations can be a tool to gain access to policymakers and shape the narrative around complex issues of innovation and competition.

The markets for electronic displays and IT services are defined globally or at least EEA-wide, reflecting international supply chains and customer bases⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴. While a transaction may be cleared because it doesn’t raise competition concerns under any plausible market definition⁵⁵⁵⁵, the underlying industries are dominated by major global players. These corporations engage with governments worldwide on issues of trade, tariffs, subsidies for manufacturing, and technical standards. Securing large government IT contracts, a key segment of the IT services market, often involves navigating a political process where lobbying and established relationships can be decisive⁶.

The video game industry operates on a market for development and publishing and a separate one for distribution, both of which are considered at least EEA-wide⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷. The commission contemplated segmenting the market by platform (PC, console, mobile) and genre but ultimately left the definitions open due to inconclusive evidence and supply-side flexibility⁸⁸⁸⁸. This industry is a major economic and cultural force, leading to political engagement on issues such as content regulation, tax incentives for development studios, and international trade policies that affect global distribution.

Finally, the management of intellectual property rights for authors and publishers is a market built entirely on a legal and regulatory framework⁹⁹⁹⁹. In Spain, the market is national, with collecting societies like SGAE operating as de facto monopolies for certain rights¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰. These entities engage in a double competition: attracting rights holders to their repertoire and licensing that repertoire to users¹¹. Their tariff-setting ability and governance are highly political. The emergence of potential competitors like independent management entities (OGIs) is a direct result of EU-level directives aimed at liberalizing these markets¹²¹²¹²¹², demonstrating how political decisions at a supranational level can reshape a nationally-defined market. The power held by these societies makes their relationship with government and their lobbying efforts on copyright law profoundly important.

Pharmaceuticals: Navigating National Regulatory Gateways

The pharmaceutical sector is fundamentally shaped by government regulation. The case concerning Finished Dose Pharmaceuticals (FDPs) for central nervous system disorders and the case on HIV drugs both underscore this reality. The product market is consistently defined using the Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) system, typically starting at the ATC3 level, which groups drugs by therapeutic indication¹³¹³¹³¹³. However, narrower definitions at the ATC4 level or even by individual molecule are considered where competitive constraints warrant it¹⁴.

Crucially, the geographic market for marketed pharmaceuticals is consistently defined as national in scope¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵. This is a direct consequence of national authorities controlling pricing, reimbursement systems, and marketing authorisations¹⁶¹⁶¹⁶¹⁶. This national focus creates a powerful incentive for pharmaceutical companies to engage in lobbying and political donations at the Member State level. Their objective is to influence decisions on which drugs are approved, how they are priced, and whether they will be covered by public health insurance.

In contrast, the market for pipeline products—drugs still in the research and development phase—is considered to be at least EEA-wide, and possibly global¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷. R&D is a global endeavor, but even here, political influence can play a role in securing public research funding and shaping the regulatory environment for clinical trials. The distinction between the global nature of R&D and the national nature of sales is a core feature of the pharmaceutical industry’s political economy.

Financial Services and Mining: Markets of Trust, Regulation, and Access

The equities trading market, like pharmaceuticals, is heavily influenced by regulation. The Office of Fair Trading noted the significant changes to the competitive landscape brought about by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸. This directive harmonized regulations across the EU and enabled the rise of new trading platforms (MTFs) to compete with traditional exchanges¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹. The geographic market is therefore seen as at least pan-European, if not wider²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰. Financial institutions are among the most active lobbyists and political donors, seeking to shape the complex regulations that govern their operations, capital requirements, and competitive opportunities.

The mining sector involves access to and extraction of raw materials, such as barium, manganese, and iron ore²¹²¹²¹²¹. While the market for iron ore is multinational, driven by seaborne trade ²², the analysis also recognizes that competition is shaped by infrastructure and logistics²³²³²³²³. For less globally-traded minerals, the market was cautiously assessed as national, with UK customers placing significant value on local suppliers²⁴²⁴²⁴²⁴. In either case, the industry is highly dependent on government for mining permits, environmental regulations, and land access. This dependence makes a positive relationship with government officials essential, and political donations can be a means of fostering such relationships and navigating the complex regulatory and approval processes inherent to the sector.

In the context of the provided case files, a “political donations” angle requires analyzing how market definitions and competitive assessments could be influenced by, or have implications for, political considerations, lobbying, and the exercise of influence by major industry players. While the decisions themselves are based on legal and economic principles, the underlying dynamics of these concentrated industries often involve significant interaction with governmental and regulatory bodies.

Technology, Telecommunications, and Cloud Computing

The technology sector, encompassing chipset manufacturing, computer hardware, and cloud services, is characterized by rapid innovation, high barriers to entry due to R&D costs and intellectual property, and the power of network effects.

Chipset Manufacturing: In the chipset manufacturing case, the European Commission undertook a detailed analysis of substitutability between different chipset technologies (e.g., LTE vs. GSM vs. UMTS)¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹. The decision not to include so-called “captive production” (chipsets made by device manufacturers for their own use) in the relevant market is significant². A company with a dominant position in the merchant market for a critical technology like LTE chipsets wields considerable power. This dominance is not just commercial; it translates into influence over technology standards and future industry direction, areas where political and regulatory engagement is crucial. Large tech firms are known to be major political donors, and their ability to lobby on issues like patent law, trade tariffs, and technology standards is directly linked to their market power. Defining a market narrowly, as was done here by excluding older technologies, can highlight a company’s dominance, potentially attracting greater regulatory and political scrutiny.
Cloud and Enterprise IT: The case concerning computer servers and external enterprise storage systems illustrates a market with complex potential segmentations by price, functionality, and architecture (e.g., SAN vs. NAS)³³³³. The commission’s decision to leave the precise market definition open is common when a transaction doesn’t raise competitive concerns even on the narrowest plausible definition⁴. However, the underlying industry structure is one of a few large players (like Dell/EMC) competing for large enterprise and government contracts⁵. These contracts, particularly in the public sector, are often subject to intense lobbying efforts and political influence. The ability to offer “converged infrastructure systems”—pre-bundled solutions of servers, storage, and software—can be a key advantage⁶. A company’s ability to secure large government contracts can be enhanced through political donations and lobbying, creating a feedback loop where market success and political influence reinforce each other.

Energy, Utilities, and Infrastructure

The energy and infrastructure sectors are heavily regulated and often involve natural monopolies or oligopolies. Political donations in these industries can be aimed at influencing regulatory frameworks, securing favorable tariffs, and winning public tenders.

Electricity and Gas Supply: The E.ON/Innogy case provides a detailed breakdown of the electricity and gas markets, with numerous distinct markets defined by customer type (household, SME, large industrial), service (generation, distribution, retail), and geography (national, regional, local)⁷. This high level of segmentation reflects the regulated nature of the industry⁸⁸⁸⁸. For example, the introduction of a government price cap on standard variable tariffs for households in the UK directly impacts market dynamics⁹. In such an environment, energy companies have a strong incentive to engage in political donations to influence regulatory bodies that set price caps, approve infrastructure projects, and define service obligations. The distinction between national markets for competitive supply and local or regional markets for distribution networks highlights where political influence might be directed—at both national and local levels.
Electric Vehicle Charging: The emerging market for electric vehicle charging stations shows how new technology intersects with established infrastructure. The analysis distinguishes between charging speeds (ultra-fast vs. fast/regular) and locations (on-motorway vs. off-motorway)¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰¹⁰. The geographic market is considered potentially national but with strong local competition elements¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹. The rollout of this critical infrastructure is heavily dependent on government policy, subsidies, and access to public land and motorway service areas. Companies entering this market would have a significant interest in lobbying for favorable regulations, securing government grants, and influencing public procurement processes. Political donations could be seen as a tool to gain an edge in this highly strategic and politically sensitive area.
Construction and Engineering (Catenaries and Nuclear): The case involving the installation of railway catenaries and services for the civil nuclear industry highlights markets where customers are often state-owned or heavily regulated entities¹²¹²¹²¹². The market for catenary installation is deemed national due to differing technical standards and regulations ¹³¹³¹³¹³, while the market for HVAC services in the civil nuclear industry is also national, with even more stringent qualification requirements creating high barriers to entry¹⁴¹⁴¹⁴¹⁴. In these markets, securing contracts is not just a matter of price and quality but also of having the right relationships and navigating complex public procurement rules. Political donations can be a means to build relationships, gain access to decision-makers, and influence the design of tenders in a way that favors a particular company’s technical specifications or experience. The high-stakes nature of these large infrastructure projects makes them a focal point for political lobbying.

Precious Commodities and Luxury Goods

Diamonds: The diamond industry case illustrates a market with a unique structure, from the global supply of rough diamonds to the retail sale of diamond jewelry¹⁵. The commission considered segmenting the rough diamond market by quality but ultimately did not, noting that the dominance of a player like De Beers would persist regardless¹⁶. The market for rough diamonds is global¹⁷. This industry has historically been associated with significant political engagement, particularly in relation to the sourcing of raw materials from various countries. Companies in this sector lobby on issues of international trade, conflict mineral regulations, and tariffs. On the retail side, the creation of a “luxury” image, as argued by the parties, is crucial¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸¹⁸. While direct political donations may be less about influencing specific retail regulations, they can be part of a broader strategy to maintain a brand’s prestige and association with the establishment.

Chemicals and Financial Services

Chemicals: The chemical distribution market is typically seen as national in scope, driven by the logistics of warehousing and delivery radiuses¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹. The market for chemical manufacturing can be wider, from EEA-wide to global, depending on the specific product²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰. This is a highly regulated industry, with significant lobbying efforts directed at environmental regulations, health and safety standards, and chemical registration rules (like the EU’s REACH regulation). Political donations can be used to influence the stringency of these regulations, which can have a major impact on a company’s cost structure and competitive position.
Financial Clearing Services: The market for on-exchange trading and clearing services is considered EEA-wide²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹²¹. This sector is subject to extensive financial regulation. The debate over whether to treat cleared and uncleared products as distinct markets highlights the importance of regulatory frameworks²². Large financial institutions are among the most significant political donors, and their lobbying focuses on influencing financial regulations, capital requirements, and rules governing derivatives and other complex financial instruments. A favorable regulatory environment, shaped in part by political engagement, is a key determinant of success in this industry.

In conclusion, across all these diverse industries, the definition of the market and the subsequent competition analysis take place within a broader political and economic context. Where markets are concentrated, highly regulated, dependent on public procurement, or involve strategic technologies, the incentive for companies to engage in political donations and lobbying is high. This engagement can be aimed at shaping the very rules that define their markets, influencing the outcomes of regulatory decisions, and securing a competitive advantage that goes beyond the traditional metrics of price and quality.

INDUSTRIES, SECTORS, MARKETS

Of course. I will conduct the requested research and analysis to identify the specific sectors, markets, and industries potentially affected by the causes of action we have uncovered. The analysis will use the provided industry classification codes to add precision and will be presented in clean prose, as instructed.

This analysis identifies several key sectors of the UK and European economies that could be directly or indirectly affected by the alleged causes of action, specifically where opaque political donations or lobbying activities are alleged to have resulted in distorted policy, regulation, or procurement decisions. For each sector, an assessment is provided on the potential for affected parties to seek recourse or join a public campaign.

One of the most significantly impacted areas is the Energy sector. The transition to a low-carbon economy involves major policy decisions, regulatory frameworks, and subsidy allocations that create clear winners and losers. Alleged undue influence from incumbent fossil fuel companies, which operate within industries such as the Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas (SIC Code 06) and the Manufacture of Refined Petroleum Products (NACE Code 19.20), could result in policies that delay the energy transition. This could manifest as less favourable grid connection rules, slower planning approval processes for renewable projects, or subsidy regimes that favour traditional energy sources. The direct harm falls upon companies in the renewable energy sector, such as those involved in the Production of Electricity from Wind and Solar sources (NACE Code 35.11) or the Manufacture of Electric Motors and Generators (SIC Code 27.11). For these firms, the probability of success in a legal claim for direct compensation is likely low. Proving in court that a specific, complex energy policy was the direct and unlawful result of a particular donation is an exceptionally high evidentiary bar. However, the probability of these companies joining a media campaign is high. The narrative of innovative, future-focused green energy companies being unfairly disadvantaged by vested incumbents is compelling and aligns with their commercial interests and public image.

A second critical area is Public Procurement and Infrastructure, covering sectors such as Construction of Roads and Railways (SIC Code 42.1) and other large-scale public works. Here, the alleged harm stems from government contracts being awarded unfairly. A large, established contractor, potentially active in making political donations, might be favoured over more efficient or innovative competitors. The primary victims are the losing bidders, often small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that lack the political connections or lobbying power of larger rivals. Taxpayers are also indirect victims, as skewed procurement can result in poor value for money and higher costs. The probability of a successful legal claim is moderate, but only in specific circumstances. Procurement law provides a defined, albeit swift, route to challenge a specific contract award decision, typically with a 30-day time limit. A losing bidder could succeed if they can demonstrate that the process itself was flawed, biased, or irrational, without necessarily having to prove a direct link to a donation. The probability of harmed SMEs joining a media campaign is also moderate. While the narrative of unfairness is strong, these firms may be hesitant to publicly antagonise a government department from which they hope to win future work. A campaign would need to be carefully framed around the principle of fair competition rather than an attack on a specific ministry.

The Finance and Technology sectors represent a third key battleground, particularly concerning regulatory capture. Large, incumbent institutions in Banking (NACE Code K64.19) or major firms in Computer Programming and Consultancy (SIC Code Division 62) may allegedly lobby for complex regulatory frameworks. While appearing neutral, these frameworks can create significant compliance burdens that serve as barriers to entry for smaller, innovative firms in the Financial Technology (FinTech) and software start-up space. This alleged behaviour stifles competition and reduces consumer choice. For a harmed FinTech firm, the probability of a successful legal claim to strike down a piece of complex financial regulation is low. Courts are highly deferential to the expertise of regulators like the Financial Conduct Authority. A challenger would face an immense struggle to prove the regulation was irrational. Conversely, the probability of these firms joining a media campaign is very high. The narrative of the agile innovator versus the entrenched incumbent is central to the FinTech identity, and these companies are often adept at using public relations and political pressure to advocate for open markets and a level regulatory playing field.

Finally, a sector with significant negative social spillovers is the Gambling and Betting industry (NACE Code 92.00). The harm alleged here is that donations and lobbying from major betting companies could lead to the delay or watering-down of crucial public health regulations, such as affordability checks or stake limits. The direct victims in a moral sense are individuals suffering from gambling addiction and their families, with taxpayers bearing the indirect cost of health services. The probability of success for an individual claiming compensation on the basis that their addiction was caused by weak regulation is extremely low due to the remote and complex chain of causation. However, public health charities and campaign groups acting as advocates for these victims have a high probability of joining a media campaign. These organisations are highly motivated, have a powerful moral case, and are experienced in using public and media pressure to influence government policy on public health matters, making them natural and essential allies.

INDUSTRY CODES – GEMINI

Report on Alleged Undue Influence in UK Political Decision-Making: Legal Analysis and Pre-Action Correspondence

Introduction

This report provides a consolidated legal analysis of several distinct but interconnected causes of action related to the alleged undue influence of political donations and lobbying on UK public administration. It is prepared for COCOO by its solicitors. The analysis is based on a review of parliamentary records, lobbying registers, expert commentary, and supplementary legal research, now refined through the application of specific industry classification codes (NACE, SIC, ICB) to precisely identify the sectors and markets allegedly affected by the matters under review.

The purpose is to articulate the legal grounds upon which specific decisions, acts, or omissions by public bodies might be challenged, primarily through the mechanism of Judicial Review, and to provide draft pre-action correspondence to the potential perpetrators. All claims of wrongdoing are framed as ‘alleged’.

Cause of Action 1: Alleged Failure to Enforce Political Donation Rules (PPERA)

Detailed Analysis

This cause of action centres on the alleged failure of The Electoral Commission to robustly enforce the legal framework governing political donations, as established by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). Concerns have been repeatedly raised regarding the alleged exploitation of loopholes that allow for opaque or potentially impermissible donations. This issue creates systemic risk across all sectors of the economy, as any policy area could be influenced. However, sectors with high reliance on government regulation and contracts, such as Defence (SIC Code 84.22), Energy Extraction (SIC Code Division 06), and Pharmaceuticals (SIC Code 21), are particularly vulnerable to the potential for distorted policy outcomes arising from such alleged regulatory failure.

A specific failure by the Commission, such as an omission to investigate a suspicious donation or a decision to impose a manifestly inadequate penalty, may be subject to Judicial Review. A legal challenge would argue that such an omission or decision is unlawful, irrational, and a failure to discharge the Commission’s statutory duty to maintain public confidence in the integrity of political finance. Legal precedent shows that while courts are deferential to regulatory discretion, a decision made without proper consideration of relevant factors, such as the need for effective deterrence, can be quashed.

The harm to the public interest is severe. It includes an erosion of public trust in the democratic process and the risk of policy capture. For example, a failure to properly scrutinise donations from entities in the Gambling and Betting Activities sector (NACE Code 92.00) could lead to weaker public health regulation, creating significant societal costs. The financial impact of such policy distortion is difficult to quantify but could translate into billions of pounds through inefficient market outcomes, poor value public contracts, or increased social harm.

Letter Before Action

To The Chair of the Board of Commissioners, The Electoral Commission.

We are instructed by our client, COCOO, a public interest organisation. We write in accordance with the Pre-Action Protocol for Judicial Review concerning the Commission’s alleged failure to take adequate enforcement action regarding a donation made to [Political Party Name] by [Donor Entity Name] on or around [Date].

The donation in question allegedly raises serious questions of permissibility under PPERA. Our information suggests that [Donor Entity Name], which operates within the [Specify Sector, e.g., Financial Services, NACE Code K] sector, may not be a permissible donor due to an alleged lack of genuine business activity in the UK. This matter was, we understand, previously brought to the Commission’s attention.

The alleged failure to launch a formal investigation appears to be an unlawful omission. It is our client’s position that this alleged inaction is potentially illegal, as a failure to properly discharge your statutory duties under PPERA, and irrational, in that no reasonable regulator presented with the alleged facts would fail to act. This alleged failure damages public confidence and creates a risk of improper influence over policy affecting a key sector of the UK economy.

To avoid our client issuing a claim for Judicial Review, we request a substantive response within fourteen days detailing what steps the Commission has taken to investigate the permissibility of this donation and the full reasoning for its decision not to take further action. Please provide all non-privileged documents relating to this decision. We reserve the right to bring a claim for Judicial Review without further notice.

Yours faithfully, COCOO’s Solicitors.

Cause of Action 2: Alleged Undue Influence via Opaque Lobbying (TUAA)

Detailed Analysis

This cause of action addresses government decisions allegedly influenced by opaque lobbying activities that fall outside the narrow scope of the Transparency of Lobbying Act 2014 (TUAA). The regulatory framework fails to cover the majority of influencing activities, particularly those conducted by in-house lobbyists from large corporations in sectors like Telecommunications (NACE Code J61) or Banking (NACE Code K64.19). A specific decision that benefits an entity known to have engaged in extensive, unregulated lobbying could be challenged in court.

A Judicial Review would not target the inadequacy of TUAA itself, but the lawfulness of the resulting government decision. The grounds would focus on procedural impropriety, alleging that the process was unfair due to an appearance of bias or because disproportionate weight was given to secret representations from lobbyists while contrary evidence from competitors or the public was ignored. Furthermore, a decision that lacks a clear public interest rationale and appears tailored to the demands of a lobbyist could be challenged as being made for an improper purpose or as being Wednesbury unreasonable, especially if it promotes harmful ‘rent-seeking’.

The harm is that of policy capture, leading to distorted markets. For instance, if lobbying by major software development companies (ICB Code 10101015) leads to procurement rules that disadvantage smaller UK-based competitors, it stifles innovation and competition, with potential economic losses in the hundreds of millions.

Letter Before Action

To The Permanent Secretary, [Name of Government Department].

We are instructed by our client, COCOO. We write in accordance with the Pre-Action Protocol for Judicial Review to challenge the lawfulness of the decision made by the Secretary of State on or around [Date] regarding [Subject of Decision, e.g., the new regulatory standards for the Water Collection, Treatment and Supply sector, SIC Code 36.00].

It is our client’s position that this decision is unlawful on grounds of procedural impropriety. Our information suggests that in the period preceding this decision, departmental Ministers and officials held numerous undisclosed meetings with representatives of [Name of Lobbying Entity], which stands to benefit significantly from the decision. This opaque process allegedly gave improper weight to the representations of this single entity while failing to properly consider the wider public interest and evidence from other stakeholders.

This alleged procedural unfairness and appearance of bias taints the legality of the final decision. The harm to the public interest is significant, including potential environmental damage and increased costs for consumers, alongside a serious erosion of public confidence in the impartiality of your department.

To avoid the need for litigation, we request that you provide, within fourteen days, a schedule of all meetings between the department and [Name of Lobbying Entity] regarding this matter, the minutes for any such meetings, and the full and detailed reasoning for the decision, including all impact assessments and expert advice considered. Should we not receive a satisfactory response, our client intends to issue a claim for Judicial Review seeking to quash the decision.

Yours faithfully, COCOO’s Solicitors.

Appendix: Identification of Potentially Relevant Third-Party Entities

This section identifies corporate and non-corporate entities that may have an interest in the matters outlined in this report, either as potential claimants, allies, or as competitors to the alleged perpetrators. The identification is based on an analysis of relevant SIC, NACE, and ICB industry codes derived from the causes of action. Contact is best initiated through the general counsel, legal, or public affairs departments, accessible via corporate websites.

In the UK Energy sector, a key area of interest concerns competition between traditional and renewable sources. Entities operating within SIC Code Division 06 (Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas), such as Shell plc and BP plc, are major incumbents whose interests may be relevant. Their corporate headquarters provide publicly listed contact details for legal and corporate affairs. On the other side, potential claimants and allies operate within SIC Code Division 35 (Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply), particularly in renewables. This includes major UK-listed firms like SSE plc and ScottishPower Ltd (a subsidiary of the Spanish company Iberdrola, S.A.), who are significant operators of renewable assets and could be commercially harmed by any policy allegedly skewed against them.

Across Europe, the financial services sector provides another area of focus. Large incumbent banks, classified under NACE Code K64.19 (Other monetary intermediation), may be relevant parties in any review of financial regulation. In contrast, challenger firms in the Financial Technology (FinTech) space could be potential claimants. This includes UK entities such as Monzo Bank Ltd and Revolut Ltd, as well as firms with significant European operations like Wise plc. Industry bodies such as Innovate Finance in the UK would be a key point of contact to identify a wider class of potentially affected businesses that feel disadvantaged by regulations allegedly influenced by incumbents.

In the retail and consumer goods market, policies on procurement or food standards could be relevant. Major UK supermarkets, such as Tesco plc and J Sainsbury plc, operate within NACE Code G47.11 (Retail sale in non-specialised stores with food, beverages or tobacco predominating). Alleged influence by such large entities could harm smaller competitors. Potential allies and claimants would therefore include members of the British Independent Retailers Association (BIRA) or the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB). Furthermore, alternative suppliers like Riverford Organic Farmers, who operate in a different part of the agricultural supply chain (NACE Code A01, Crop and animal production), could be impacted by food standards allegedly skewed to favour large-scale, non-organic production methods.

Finally, in the technology sector, particularly software and IT services (ICB Supersector 1010, Technology), alleged influence over public procurement rules is a key concern. Large multinational technology corporations may be relevant parties. Potential claimants would include smaller, domestic software development and IT consulting firms who may be excluded from competition by allegedly biased procurement criteria. Trade associations representing small and medium-sized enterprises in the tech sector across the UK and Spain would be valuable partners in identifying a class of harmed businesses.

CONTACTS GEMINI

Report on Alleged Undue Influence in UK Political and Regulatory Decision-Making: Potential Legal Challenges and Pre-Action Correspondence

Introduction

This report provides a consolidated analysis of several distinct but interconnected causes of action related to the alleged undue influence of political donations and lobbying on UK public administration. It is prepared for COCOO by its solicitors. The analysis is based on a review of parliamentary records, lobbying registers, expert commentary, and supplementary legal research into relevant precedents and points of law.

The purpose is to articulate the legal grounds upon which specific decisions, acts, or omissions by public bodies might be challenged, primarily through Judicial Review, and to provide draft pre-action correspondence to the potential perpetrators. All claims of wrongdoing are framed as ‘alleged’.

Cause of Action 1: Alleged Failure to Enforce Political Donation Rules (PPERA)

Detailed Analysis:

This cause of action centres on the alleged failure of The Electoral Commission (EC) to robustly enforce the legal framework governing political donations, as established by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). Concerns have been repeatedly raised in public and parliamentary discourse regarding the alleged exploitation of loopholes that allow for opaque or potentially impermissible donations, for instance through UK-registered shell companies with no genuine domestic business activity or via unincorporated associations that obscure the original source of funds.

The specific failure that may be subject to Judicial Review is an omission or decision by the EC not to investigate a suspicious donation, or a decision to impose a penalty that is allegedly manifestly inadequate. The statutory maximum fine of £20,000 per breach is widely considered an insufficient deterrent for multi-million-pound organisations, a point frequently made by the Committee on Standards in Public Life.

A legal challenge would argue that the EC has a statutory duty to monitor and secure compliance with PPERA. A decision not to investigate a credible allegation of an impermissible donation, or to apply a penalty that has no realistic deterrent effect, could be challenged on several grounds. First, it may be an unlawful failure to discharge a statutory duty. Second, it could be deemed irrational in the Wednesbury sense if the decision is so unreasonable, given the evidence of a potential breach and the importance of democratic integrity, that no reasonable regulator could have reached it. The courts are generally deferential to regulators’ discretion on resource allocation, as seen in cases where they decline to force broad investigations into matters of high policy like foreign interference. However, a failure to act on a specific, evidence-based complaint is more judicially reviewable. Precedent from cases reviewing regulatory bodies shows that while the bar for irrationality is high, a decision made without proper consideration of relevant factors, such as the need for deterrence or the gravity of the alleged breach, can be quashed.

The harm to the public interest is severe, encompassing an erosion of public trust in the democratic process, the potential for policy to be skewed by hidden financial interests, and the risk of covert foreign interference undermining national sovereignty. These harms, while difficult to quantify financially, represent a significant cost to the functioning of the state.

Letter Before Action

TO:

The Chair of the Board of Commissioners

The Electoral Commission

[Address]

DATE: 16 June 2025

FROM: COCOO’s Solicitors

SUBJECT: LETTER BEFORE ACTION – POTENTIAL CLAIM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW CONCERNING AN ALLEGED FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS ACT 2000 (PPERA)

Dear Chair,

We are instructed by our client, COCOO, a public interest organisation dedicated to upholding democratic integrity. We are writing in accordance with the Pre-Action Protocol for Judicial Review concerning the Electoral Commission’s alleged failure to take adequate action regarding a donation made to [Political Party Name] by [Donor Entity Name] on or around [Date].

The donation in question, in the sum of [Amount], allegedly raises serious questions of permissibility under PPERA. Our information suggests that [Donor Entity Name] may not be a permissible donor due to [State reason, e.g., an alleged lack of genuine business activity in the UK, its status as a potential conduit for impermissible funds, its opaque ownership structure]. This information was, we understand, previously brought to the Commission’s attention.

The alleged failure of the Commission to launch a formal investigation into this matter, or alternatively the imposition of a penalty that is manifestly insufficient to act as a credible deterrent, appears to be an unlawful omission or decision. It is our client’s position that this alleged inaction or inadequate action is potentially:

Illegal, as a failure to properly discharge your statutory duties under PPERA to monitor compliance and enforce the rules on the permissibility of donations.
Irrational, in that no reasonable regulator, presented with the alleged facts and conscious of its duty to maintain public confidence in the integrity of political finance, would fail to investigate or would apply a manifestly ineffective sanction.

The alleged failure to enforce the law in this instance causes significant harm to the public interest by undermining the core principles of transparency and fairness in the funding of political parties, and risks eroding public confidence.

To avoid the necessity of our client issuing a claim for Judicial Review, we request that you provide, within 14 days of the date of this letter, a substantive response detailing:

What steps, if any, the Commission has taken to investigate the permissibility of the aforementioned donation.
The full reasoning for the Commission’s decision not to take further action, or the reasoning for the specific sanction applied.
Copies of all non-privileged documents, minutes, and correspondence relating to this decision.

We await your substantive response. We reserve the right to bring a claim for Judicial Review without further notice should we not receive a satisfactory response within the specified timeframe.

Yours faithfully,

COCOO’s Solicitors

Cause of Action 2: Alleged Undue Influence via Opaque Lobbying (TUAA)

Detailed Analysis:

This cause of action addresses decisions by Government Ministers or Departments that are allegedly influenced by opaque lobbying activities. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (TUAA) is widely seen as inadequate, as it only covers consultant lobbyists communicating with a very narrow group of senior officials. It does not cover in-house lobbyists, trade associations, or law firms, nor does it cover lobbying directed at the vast majority of MPs, Peers, and other civil servants.

This regulatory gap allegedly allows significant influence to be exerted on policy and legislation without public scrutiny. A specific government decision (e.g., a policy change, the granting of a permit, a specific regulatory carve-out) that benefits an entity known to have engaged in extensive, albeit unregulated, lobbying could be challenged via Judicial Review.

The legal challenge would not target the inadequacy of TUAA itself, as that is primary legislation. Instead, it would target the lawfulness of the specific decision made. The grounds could be:

Procedural Impropriety: If it can be shown that the decision-making process was unfair. This could include a failure to conduct a proper public consultation, giving disproportionate weight to the representations of lobbyists while ignoring other evidence (an unequal treatment of information), or an appearance of bias due to undisclosed meetings between the decision-maker and the benefiting lobbyist.
Irrationality / Improper Purpose: If the decision lacks a clear public-interest rationale and appears tailored to the specific demands of the lobbying entity, it could be challenged as being made for an improper purpose (to benefit a special interest) or as being Wednesbury unreasonable. This is strengthened if the decision appears to promote harmful ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour that benefits the lobbyist at the expense of consumers, competitors, or the taxpayer.

The harm here is the potential for ‘policy capture’, where government decisions serve private interests rather than the public good. This can lead to distorted markets, higher costs for consumers, inefficient allocation of taxpayer funds, and a fundamental breakdown in trust between the government and the governed.

Letter Before Action

TO:

The Permanent Secretary

[Name of Government Department]

[Address]

DATE: 16 June 2025

FROM: COCOO’s Solicitors

SUBJECT: LETTER BEFORE ACTION – POTENTIAL CLAIM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW CONCERNING THE DECISION OF [DATE] REGARDING [SUBJECT OF DECISION]

Dear Permanent Secretary,

We are instructed by our client, COCOO, a public interest organisation dedicated to upholding standards of good governance and transparency. We write in accordance with the Pre-Action Protocol for Judicial Review.

We wish to challenge the lawfulness of the decision made by the Secretary of State on or around [Date] to [describe the decision, e.g., ‘approve the regulatory change concerning X’, ‘grant the permit for project Y’].

It is our client’s position that this decision is unlawful on grounds of procedural impropriety and the consideration of irrelevant factors. Our information suggests that in the period leading up to this decision, Ministers and/or officials within the Department held numerous meetings and communications with representatives of [Name of Lobbying Entity], an entity that stands to benefit significantly from the decision. We note that the majority of this influencing activity appears to fall outside the narrow scope of the statutory register established by TUAA, and as such has not been subject to public scrutiny.

We are concerned that the representations made during this opaque lobbying process were given disproportionate and improper weight in the decision-making process, while contrary evidence and the interests of other stakeholders (including consumers, competitors, and the wider public) were allegedly sidelined. The decision-making process appears to have been procedurally unfair. Furthermore, the final decision lacks a clear public interest rationale and appears to align so closely with the known objectives of [Name of Lobbying Entity] as to suggest it was made for an improper purpose.

The harm to the public interest is significant, including potential damage to fair competition, increased costs for consumers, and a serious erosion of public confidence in the impartiality of government decision-making.

To enable our client to understand the basis for this decision and to avoid the need for litigation, we request that you provide, within 14 days, the following:

A schedule of all meetings and correspondence between departmental Ministers/officials and representatives of [Name of Lobbying Entity] regarding this matter between [Date] and [Date].
The minutes, notes, and agendas for any such meetings.
The full and detailed reasons for the decision, including any impact assessments, submissions, and expert advice considered.

Should we not receive a satisfactory response, our client intends to issue a claim for Judicial Review to seek an order to quash the decision.

Yours faithfully,

COCOO’s Solicitors

Intelligence Report: Identification of Potentially Affected Entities

Objective: To identify companies and organisations in sectors relevant to our causes of action who may be potential claimants, class members, or allies in challenging alleged undue influence. The scope covers the UK, wider Europe, and Spain.

Sector 1: Energy (Focus: Competition between Fossil Fuels and Renewables)

Context: Alleged policy decisions influenced by donations/lobbying from fossil fuel incumbents, potentially disadvantaging renewable energy competitors.
Potential Claimants/Allies (Renewable Energy Sector):
- Company Name: Ørsted
- Contact: Publicly available contact forms on corporate website; media and investor relations contacts are listed. Focus on Public Affairs or Legal departments.
- Relevance: Major UK/European wind farm operator. Potentially disadvantaged by policies favouring fossil fuels (e.g., slower grid connections, less favourable subsidies).
- Company Name: Iberdrola / ScottishPower
- Contact: General contact forms and investor relations contacts available online for both the Spanish parent company and its UK subsidiary.
- Relevance: Major player in UK and Spanish renewables market. A key competitor to traditional energy companies and a potential claimant if policy is skewed.
- Company Name: SSE Renewables
- Contact: General corporate and media contacts available online.
- Relevance: Leading developer and operator of renewable energy in the UK. Directly competes with fossil fuel generators for investment and policy support.
- Company Name: Solarcentury (now part of Statkraft)
- Contact: Contact through parent company Statkraft’s corporate channels.
- Relevance: Major solar developer. Potentially harmed by planning or subsidy policies that do not favour solar development.
- Industry Body: RenewableUK
- Contact: General contact and press office emails available on their website.
- Relevance: Represents the UK wind and marine energy industry. A potential key ally for advocacy and identifying multiple affected members.

Sector 2: Financial Services & Technology (Focus: Regulation and Competition)

Context: Alleged influence on financial or technology regulation by large incumbent firms, potentially creating barriers to entry or unfavourable conditions for smaller FinTech or tech challengers.
Potential Claimants/Allies (Challenger Banks / FinTech):
- Company Name: Monzo Bank
- Contact: General support and press contacts available. Direct legal or public affairs contacts would require specific research.
- Relevance: A key UK challenger bank potentially affected by regulations on capital requirements, data sharing, or payment systems influenced by incumbent banks.
- Company Name: Revolut
- Contact: Publicly available contact forms and press office details.
- Relevance: Global FinTech firm with a major UK presence. Directly competes with traditional banks and could be harmed by biased regulation.
- Company Name: Wise (formerly TransferWise)
- Contact: Investor relations and press contacts are public.
- Relevance: Specialises in international money transfers, a market where traditional banks are major players. Potentially affected by regulations on cross-border payments.
- Industry Body: Innovate Finance
- Contact: General membership and contact emails available on their website.
- Relevance: Represents the UK’s FinTech community. A key potential partner to identify multiple affected start-ups and growth companies.

Sector 3: Retail & Consumer Goods (Focus: Unfair Competition)

Context: Alleged influence on procurement, planning, or food standards that may benefit large supermarket chains or manufacturers over smaller independent retailers or suppliers.
Potential Claimants/Allies (Independent Retailers / Alternative Suppliers):
- Organisation: Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)
- Contact: Publicly listed contact details for press and policy teams.
- Relevance: Represents a vast number of small businesses, including independent retailers, who could be harmed by policies favouring large corporations.
- Organisation: British Independent Retailers Association (BIRA)
- Contact: General contact and membership emails available on website.
- Relevance: Directly represents independent retailers. A potential source for identifying specific examples of harm from allegedly biased planning or business rates policies.
- Company Name: Riverford Organic Farmers
- Contact: General customer service and press contacts available.
- Relevance: An alternative food supplier model. Potentially affected by food and agriculture regulations allegedly influenced by major supermarket chains or industrial agriculture lobbyists. Could represent a class of similar organic/alternative producers.

This intelligence report provides a starting point for outreach to build a coalition of affected parties who may be interested in supporting or joining future legal or advocacy actions.

CONTACTS DEEPSEEK

Based on the provided documents, here are the key companies, organizations, and contact details that operate in sectors relevant to COCOO’s case, categorized as potential defendants, claimants, or stakeholders in the context of undue influence in UK political and regulatory decision-making:

—

### **Potential Defendants (Entities Allegedly Engaged in Undue Influence)**
These are primarily lobbying firms, donors, and their clients identified in the lobbying registers and donation records:

#### **Lobbying Firms & Public Affairs Companies:**
1. **APCO Worldwide**
– Clients: Accenture, Apple, AstraZeneca, Coca-Cola, Gilead, Johnson & Johnson, Microsoft, Reckitt, Tullow Oil
– Sector: Cross-sector (Healthcare, Tech, Energy, Consumer Goods)

2. **Cicero Group**
– Clients: Financial services and tech sectors (specific clients not listed in detail)
– Sector: Finance, Technology

3. **Portland Communications**
– Clients: Wide range of prominent clients across diverse sectors
– Sector: Cross-sector

4. **Hanover Communications**
– Clients: Healthcare and technology sectors
– Sector: Healthcare, Tech

5. **FTI Consulting**
– Clients: Bradford Estates, Keepmoat Homes, Thames Enterprise Park
– Sector: Property, Infrastructure

6. **Lexington Communications**
– Clients: Extensive list across multiple sectors
– Sector: Cross-sector

7. **5654 & Company Ltd**
– Clients: Ardian, Coca-Cola, HARIBO, Heineken, National Grid ESO, Sainsbury’s
– Sector: Food & Beverage, Energy, Retail

8. **Lansons**
– Clients: Aldermore Bank, Bolt, Cayman Finance, Legal & General, London Luton Airport
– Sector: Finance, Transport

9. **The Blakeney Group**
– Clients: Octopus Energy, Pennon plc, Virgin Money
– Sector: Energy, Utilities, Finance

10. **Weber Shandwick**
– Clients: Amazon, Asda, Channel 4, Equinor, Gilead, Ikea, Mondelez
– Sector: Retail, Energy, Pharma

#### **Donors & Entities Linked to Opaque Funding:**
1. **Unincorporated Associations**
– Example: Unnamed entities funneling donations via opaque structures (specific names not disclosed in the documents).

2. **UK-Registered Companies with Minimal UK Profits**
– Example: Shell companies allegedly used to channel foreign funds (specific names not disclosed).

3. **UNISON**
– Total Donations: £5.4 million to Labour Party
– Contact: thereforyou@unison.co.uk

4. **Other High-Value Donors**
– Specific names not listed, but the documents reference “wealthy individuals and corporations” in sectors like energy, finance, and property.

—

### **Potential Claimants (Entities Harmed by Undue Influence)**
These include competitors, consumers, and public interest groups potentially harmed by rent-seeking or policy distortions:

#### **Competitors (Horizontal & Vertical):**
1. **Tesla**
– Potentially harmed by lobbying efforts of traditional dealerships (as cited in the rent-seeking example).
– Sector: Automotive

2. **Smaller Energy Firms**
– Competitors of large energy donors (e.g., Octopus Energy vs. incumbent utilities).
– Sector: Energy

3. **Independent Retailers**
– Harmed by policies favoring large donors like Amazon or Sainsbury’s.
– Sector: Retail

4. **Innovative Tech Startups**
– Disadvantaged by regulations favoring large tech donors (e.g., Microsoft, Apple).
– Sector: Technology

5. **Challenger Banks**
– Harmed by policies favoring large financial donors (e.g., Aldermore Bank, Legal & General).
– Sector: Finance

#### **Consumer & Public Interest Groups:**
1. **Which?**
– Advocacy group for consumer rights.
– Contact: via their website (not provided in the documents).

2. **Open Democracy**
– Investigates transparency and democracy issues.
– Contact: info@opendemocracy.net

3. **Transparency International UK**
– Focuses on anti-corruption and political integrity.
– Contact: info@transparency.org.uk

4. **Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)**
– Could act as a claimant in cases of anti-competitive lobbying.
– Contact: general.enquiries@cma.gov.uk

5. **Class Members (Consumers/Taxpayers)**
– Broad categories:
– UK taxpayers harmed by inefficient subsidies.
– Consumers paying higher prices due to anti-competitive policies.
– Investors in disadvantaged sectors.

—

### **Key Emails for Outreach**
– **UNISON (Donor):** thereforyou@unison.co.uk
– **Electoral Commission (Regulator):** info@electoralcommission.org.uk
– **Transparency International UK:** info@transparency.org.uk
– **CMA (Competition Authority):** general.enquiries@cma.gov.uk

—

### **Sectors with High Risk of Undue Influence**
1. **Energy** (e.g., National Grid, Octopus Energy)
2. **Finance** (e.g., Aldermore Bank, Legal & General)
3. **Healthcare/Pharma** (e.g., AstraZeneca, Johnson & Johnson)
4. **Tech** (e.g., Microsoft, Apple)
5. **Retail** (e.g., Amazon, Sainsbury’s)

—

### **Strategy for COCOO**
1. **Target Donors & Lobbying Firms:** Investigate specific donations and lobbying activities of the above-named entities.
2. **Engage Harmed Parties:** Reach out to competitors (e.g., Tesla, smaller energy firms) and consumer groups to build a coalition for legal or advocacy action.
3. **Leverage Public Registers:** Cross-reference lobbying registers (e.g., ORCL, PAB) with donation records to identify links between donors and policy outcomes.
4. **Focus on Rent-Seeking Cases:** Prioritize sectors where policy distortions (e.g., energy, finance) have clear economic harm evidence.

Let me know if you’d like further refinement or additional entities included.

GPT CONTACTS

Here are several leading UK and European entities operating in sectors where our case’s potential defendants and claimants likely overlap—across competitors, collaborators, customers, and consumers:

Financial services and fintech are heavily intersected by political donations and market concerns. Key figures include Michael Spencer (Numis, AJ Bell, Nutshell, Klarna) and Andrew Cook (steel technology), alongside prominent fintech players such as Wise, Revolut, and Monzo. These firms navigate regulation, benefit from political shifts, and could have competing claims or harms when political funding favors certain players.

In healthcare information systems, The Phoenix Partnership (TPP), founded by Frank Hester—a major Conservative donor—is entwined with NHS contracts. His dual roles as public sector contractor and political funder make TPP a central actor, likely subject to claims of competitive distortion and investor harm.

In manufacturing and infrastructure, JCB and Anthony Bamford emerge as key players donating over £8 million to the Conservatives. Their companies compete in public procurement, potentially harming rival manufacturers excluded due to policy bias.

Telecoms and data analytics markets showcase companies with NHS or government contracts—Palantir Technologies, which holds major UK healthcare contracts, contrasts with rival bidding consortia possibly disadvantaged by political-tinged procurement decisions.

Additionally, major consumers of public contracts—such as Carphone Warehouse (co-founded by David Ross), National Express, and transport services—operate close to political decision-making. Their shareholders, employees, and users could form claimants’ classes if political influence unfairly advantaged these firms or denied opportunities to rivals.

Though specific emails are not publicly available, typical corporate contact formats (e.g., info@tpphealthcare.com, press@palantir.com) may be used once outreach is authorized. Targeted letters can be drafted to procurement directors, compliance officers, and corporate secretaries across these firms.

By focusing on these intersecting sectors—fintech, healthtech, manufacturing, telecoms, and transport—we build a comprehensive map of prospective defendants (donor-linked firms) and claimants (competitors, bidders, shareholders, consumers). Each cohort shares the common harm of biased market conditions and impaired contractual opportunities, strengthening our case’s core commonality.

COMMONALITIES

Based solely on your prompts, I have identified plausible collective threats and potential commonalities among prospective class members under tort or contract law, focusing specifically on the political donations scenario for COCOO.

Firstly, there appears a collective threat relating to alleged “undue influence” on political and regulatory decision-making through opaque or improperly sourced political donations. Prospective class members could include consumers, competitors, investors, and the general public, all potentially harmed by distorted market conditions or compromised regulatory environments arising from such undue influence.

The primary commonality binding these class members together is economic and market distortion resulting from decisions influenced by political donations. Competitors, particularly businesses excluded from fair market participation due to favouritism, share common harm: loss of fair competition opportunities and market share, thus experiencing economic damage. Similarly, consumers face inflated prices, reduced choice, and diminished product quality—consequences of market distortions created by biased regulatory decisions or preferential policy treatments.

Investors constitute another important group experiencing shared harm. They suffer collectively from misleading representations about market integrity, potentially facing economic losses due to distorted market signals, artificial valuations, or compromised corporate governance resulting from undue political influence. Investors rely on transparent regulatory and political environments; compromised integrity here results in systemic market inefficiencies, financial instability, and direct economic harm.

From a tort law perspective, potential collective claims could arise under “unlawful means conspiracy,” where multiple defendants (political parties, donors, lobbyists, regulators failing their duty, or associated entities) are alleged to have acted jointly or in coordination, causing intentional harm to third parties by manipulating political or regulatory decisions. Another potential claim involves “negligent misstatement” by entities responsible for maintaining integrity and transparency—such as regulatory bodies or political parties—leading to widespread detrimental reliance by investors, consumers, and market competitors.

Regarding contract law, collective threats might emerge from breaches of implied contractual terms, particularly where public procurement or business contracts explicitly or implicitly guarantee fairness, transparency, or neutrality in awarding processes. Any breach of these terms due to biased political influence or compromised decision-making constitutes contractual harm shared by all adversely affected bidders or contractors.

Additionally, under competition law principles applicable before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), there exists commonality among claimants (businesses and consumers alike) harmed by anti-competitive practices facilitated by undue political influence, such as unfair allocation of public contracts, preferential market access, or manipulated pricing policies.

In summary, the collective threat across these class members manifests in economic losses, impaired market integrity, reduced consumer welfare, distorted competition, and compromised investment returns—all attributable to the systemic misuse of political donations to influence regulatory and political decisions. Establishing this commonality of harm would significantly strengthen COCOO’s collective litigation and regulatory strategies.

GPT STRATEGY

I have identified and developed a strategic, comprehensive analysis of the potential legal liabilities for Cocoo in respect of political donations under UK law—across tort, contract, competition, public interest, consumer and investor protection, and regulatory frameworks. The goal is to methodically progress towards risk mitigation and potential defensive positioning.

1. Breach of UK Political Donations Regulations (PPERA & Companies Act)

Cocoo must first scrutinize the permissibility of any donations or political expenditures. Under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, donations exceeding £500 are tightly regulated: only “permissible donors”—UK-registered individuals or entities—may contribute, and third-party contributions must be transparently declared. Attempts to disguise or split donations fall foul of criminal law (pinsentmasons.com).

Furthermore, Companies Act 2006 provisions regulate donations and political spending by corporations . Failure to establish corporate authority, proper approvals in board minutes, accounting, or improper classifying of promotional expenditures as “political donations” could breed regulatory and criminal exposure.

If Cocoo’s donor qualifies as foreign or the donation is routed through UK entities without economic substance, especially exploiting the widening loophole noted in recent debates over Musk/Farage, Cocoo may be caught in a regulatory crossfire—risking criminal sanctions, invalidation of donations, and reputational damage (ft.com).

2. Competition Law / Anti-Competitive Influence

While UK competition law (via the Competition Act 1998) principally addresses pricing, cartels, and market abuses, Cocoo’s political donations could trigger scrutiny if tied to anticompetitive behavior—e.g., quid pro quo agreements with public procurement authorities or distortions of market entry (competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com).

Collective actions via the Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) may be initiated by aggrieved rival firms or consumers alleging interference with fair competition. The burden of proving causation and damages in such proceedings would be high, but the reputational risk and public interest implications could be far-reaching (lexology.com).

3. Tortious Liability: Misrepresentation, Deceit, Unlawful Means Conspiracy

If Cocoo made promises or representations regarding political donations that mislead shareholders, creditors, or public stakeholders, there is potential for liability under torts such as deceit or negligent misstatement.

In particular, if Cocoo contributed to political campaigns without proper board authorization, while presenting this internally or externally as compliant or benign, it could face allegations of misrepresentation, fraud, or even conspiracy to commit unlawful means.

4. Contractual Exposure & Agency

Should Cocoo have entered into agreements (e.g., payment undertakings, sponsorships) contingent upon political favors, without board-level ratification or exceeding internal authority levels, those contracts may be voidable for lack of corporate power or genuine seal.

Furthermore, board members or agents acting beyond their authority could face claims by the company or by third parties for breach of fiduciary duty, misapplication of funds, or breach of implied contractual undertakings.

5. Public & Investor Interest / Market Integrity

Large or opaque political donations can significantly impair investor confidence. Under UK listing rules, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) requires issuers to market abuse disclosures, fair-dealing standards, and timely transparency. Cocoo may be compelled to disclose political contributions if they influence its public image or create foreseeable liabilities, triggering obligations under the Listing Rule regime.

Should investors sue for misleading statements about the company’s risk position or financial exposure, Cocoo could face civil actions for breach of disclosure duties or, in public companies, suspect insider or market mischief.

6. Public Interest: Judicial Review & Administrative Law

Even though charitable political donations are typically out of scope for tortious claims against the company, misuse of public office or covert connections to public bodies may prompt judicial review or anti-corruption investigations—especially in the vein of Porter v Magill, where misuse of council powers for political advantage was quashed (en.wikipedia.org).

Cocoo must anticipate potential claims that it exercised undue influence over political or regulatory decision-making, elevating its actions into the realm of judicial scrutiny. This could lead to injunctive relief, quashing orders, or directives for transparency.

Strategic Next Steps: A Two-Pronged Action Framework

Phase 1: Audit & Risk Reduction

Initiate a comprehensive internal audit focused on:

Donations made over £500 in the last six years.
Board minutes, delegation practices, and authority flows authorizing expenditures.
Counterparty assessments of “permissible donor” status.
Any correspondence suggesting quid pro quo arrangements.
Disclosure sufficiency under FCA and Companies House filings.

Where gaps or violations exist, immediately:

Cease suspect donations.
Implement remediation: refund or formally register undue contributions; consider self-reporting to the Electoral Commission or Companies House to leverage mitigating considerations.
Reform governance: enhance donation policies, tighten board oversight, include legal sign-off for future donations.

Phase 2: Defensive Positioning & Regulatory Engagement

Develop a public statement underpinned by legal counsel, reaffirming Cocoo’s compliance efforts, clarifying intent, and specifying remedial actions.
Liaise with the Electoral Commission proactively to clarify historical donations and flag policy enhancements.
Assess any risk of private litigation—coordinate with defence counsel to prepare pre-action engagement letters, anticipate potential shareholders or competitors.
Monitor legislative reforms, such as those targeted at foreign-based donations via UK companies. Prepare contingency for compliance if stricter profit linkage or caps are introduced (pinsentmasons.com, thetimes.co.uk, en.wikipedia.org).

Summary Narrative

Cocoo’s exposure spans multiple legal dimensions: criminal and civil contraventions of PPERA, contractual invalidity, tortious misrepresentation, market disclosure obligations, competition law entanglements, and public law risk. To mitigate, we must conduct a thorough internal audit, apply immediate remediation, strengthen governance structures, and communicate proactively with regulators. Positioning Cocoo as transparent and compliant—prepared to adapt to legislative tightening—will shield against regulatory enforcement, investor backlash, public criticism, and civil claims.

If you agree with this approach, our next steps would be:

Mobilize legal and compliance teams for record gathering and protocol review.
Draft internal audit roadmap and governance reform proposals.
Prepare stakeholder communications strategy.
Initiate regulator engagement strategy.

Let me know how you’d like to proceed—or if you’d like a deeper dive into any specific liability type.

ASKBRIAN STRATEGY

Absolutely. As solicitor for COOCOO, a comprehensive risk assessment is required across legal, competition, public interest, consumer, and investor protection domains—focusing on both tort and contract liabilities.

The first step is to systematically map all potential grounds for legal action. In tort, this involves identifying where COOCOO’s activities could result in harm to third parties, such as customers, competitors, or the wider public. Common tort claims could relate to negligence, misrepresentation, or intentional infliction of harm. If, for instance, COOCOO releases a product with undisclosed defects resulting in harm or loss, claimants may pursue compensation for foreseeable damages, especially where there was a duty of care.

From a contractual perspective, liabilities arise if COOCOO breaches written or implied terms with partners, suppliers, or customers. This can involve a failure to deliver agreed services, deviation from quality standards, or violation of exclusivity clauses. Customer or business partners could seek damages or termination of agreements if evidence of material breach exists.

Turning to competition law, it is crucial to review COOCOO’s commercial conduct for potential violations such as market abuse, collusion, cartel behavior, price-fixing, abuse of dominant position, or unfair trade practices. Legal action or investigation may result if authorities or competitors suspect the company distorts fair competition. Examples include predatory pricing strategies or tying products and services to artificially restrict competitors’ access to the market.

In relation to public interest and regulatory compliance, COOCOO can become exposed to enforcement if its business practices undermine broader social or economic policies. Factors of concern may include data privacy violations, environmental harm, failure to meet sustainability requirements, or disregard for mandated ethical standards.

Consumer and investor violations are additional vectors of liability. Misleading advertising, omission of key information, or unfair contract terms could breach consumer protection laws and lead to direct complaints, lawsuits, or administrative penalties. For investors, any misstatement or lack of transparency in reporting, insider trading, or failure to disclose risks could trigger actions for securities fraud, or regulatory action from authorities such as the financial conduct bodies.

To progress the strategy, it is prudent to conduct a thorough audit of all COOCOO’s operations, agreements, and communications. Interview relevant staff and stakeholders involved in high-risk areas. Evaluate existing process documentation and risk controls, identifying any gaps or historical incidents. Review all customer, supplier, and partner contracts for potentially unbalanced or non-compliant clauses. Analyze all competitive activities for antitrust or unfair practice exposure.

Based on these findings, develop an action plan for risk mitigation. This will involve revising problematic contracts, updating compliance protocols, refining staff training, and ensuring transparent communication with consumers and investors. Proactively engaging with relevant regulators to clarify obligations or disclose potential concerns may help reduce the likelihood or impact of claims. By continuously monitoring these risks and updating internal policies accordingly, COOCOO can maintain a defensible position while minimizing liability exposure across tort, contract, and regulatory domains.

JOIN US FREE OPEN PROJECTS ABOUT US MEDIATION ADVOCACY DONATE PRIVACY POLICY T&C

The Problem: Lobbying, Donations, and the Risk of Corruption

The Scale: Corporate Lobbying Expenditure

The UK Mechanism: All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs)

Legal Grounds for Challenge: Undue Influence and Unlawful Agreements

Energy and Infrastructure: The Politics of Access and Control

Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology: The National Gateway for Global R&D

Technology, Media, and Regulated Services: The Politics of Standards and Access

Industrial and Raw Materials: The Politics of Environment and Trade

Energy and Infrastructure: The Politics of Access and Control

Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology: The National Gateway for Global R&D

Music and Digital Content: The Politics of Copyright

Technology, Gaming, and Intellectual Property: The Politics of Standards and Ecosystems

Pharmaceuticals: Navigating National Regulatory Gateways

Financial Services and Mining: Markets of Trust, Regulation, and Access

Technology, Telecommunications, and Cloud Computing

Energy, Utilities, and Infrastructure

Precious Commodities and Luxury Goods

Chemicals and Financial Services

1. Breach of UK Political Donations Regulations (PPERA & Companies Act)

2. Competition Law / Anti-Competitive Influence

3. Tortious Liability: Misrepresentation, Deceit, Unlawful Means Conspiracy

4. Contractual Exposure & Agency

5. Public & Investor Interest / Market Integrity

6. Public Interest: Judicial Review & Administrative Law

Strategic Next Steps: A Two-Pronged Action Framework

Phase 1: Audit & Risk Reduction

Phase 2: Defensive Positioning & Regulatory Engagement

Summary Narrative